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ABSTRACT
The recent changes in the software markets gave users an unprecedented number
of alternatives for any given task. In such a competitive environment, it is imperative
to understand what drives user behavior. To that end, the research presented in
this dissertation, tries to uncover the impact of business strategies often used in the
software markets.
The dissertation is organized into three distinct studies into user choice and post
choice use of software. First using social judgment theory as foundation, zero price
strategies effects on user choice is investigated, with respect to product features,
consumer characteristics, and context effects. Second, role of social features in
moderating network effects on user choice is studied. And finally, the role of social
features on the effectiveness of add-on content strategy on continued user engagement
is investigated.
The findings of this dissertation highlight the alignments between popular business
strategies and broad software context. The dissertation contributes to the litera-
ture by uncovering hitherto overlooked complementarities between business strategy
and product features: (1) zero price strategy enhances utilitarian features but not
non-utilitarian features in software choice, (2) social features only enhance network
externalities but not social influence in user choice, (3) social features enhance the
effect of add-on content strategy in extending software engagement.
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Chapter 1
CONSUMPTION IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL PLENTY
The new digital software markets (such as Windows Store, Software Center,
Google Play) are transforming the software business. This change manifests itself as a
proliferation of alternative products for any task, today there are almost 2 million
apps in Google’s software market (AppBrain, 2016). The developers are scrambling
to find ways to survive in such a competitive market place through adopting their
business strategy. Consequence of this is proliferation in the number of free apps, as
some 90% of the apps are offered for free (AppBrain, 2016). As a result of this shift
towards freemium, the developers are more reliant on continued use of their software
to turn a profit than ever (Anderson, 2009; Ramaprasad and Papna, 2015; Amazon
Inc., 2015). The business models that work for one product often fail for another. In
such a context, understanding the effect of broader context of the software product
on the effectiveness of business strategy is key. In all three essays presented as part
of this dissertation, we study the interactions between product context and business
strategies on consumer decision making.
The freemium business strategy brought with it two major changes to the software
business: zero price to trigger initial choice behavior, and additional content available
to extend usefulness of software (Anderson, 2009; Erat and Bhaskaran, 2012). The
objective of this dissertation is then to examine the consumer decision making in choice,
purchasing, and subsequent use of software. We focus on end-user software in particular
and investigate the drivers of choice, and post-choice engagement. Success of any
software, in most general terms, can be measured through the demand and continuance
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behavior associated with it (Hwang and Thorn, 1999; Lee and Raghu, 2014). As such,
answering the choice, purchasing, and engagement questions is fundamental for IS
research. This dissertation furthers the IS research in two major ways: (1) Expanding
the existing IS research on choice that mostly focused on attitudes through a joint
investigation of context, attitudes, and product features. (2) Investigating the post
purchase engagement with a focus on strategic alignment of add-on and software
design.
Our investigation of software choice is presented in Chapter 2, followed by an
inquiry into purchasing behavior in Chapter 3. From a methodological stand point,
a choice study can either be conducted experimentally as a stated choice study, or
through secondary data as a revealed preferences study (Street and Burgess, 2007).
Both methods are used in this dissertation to present a comprehensive picture of the
choice and subsequent purchasing phenomenon. This duality of methodologies allows
me to expand upon existing research in IS on the topic, which has so far been limited
to attitudinal studies (Schwarz and Schwarz, 2009; Aguirre-Urreta and Marakas, 2012).
The stated choice study presented in Chapter 2, investigates the effects of zero
price in the choice context. The study expands upon the prior literature by jointly
examining the three dimensions of choice -namely product features, consumer charac-
teristics, and context effects- jointly. We use Social Judgment Theory as a theoretical
framework to bring together the three dimensions of choice (Sherif and Hovland,
1961). The anchoring, assimilation and ego involvement mechanism of social judgment
theory enables such a comprehensive inquiry. To collect the data needed for this
study, we designed and implemented a discrete choice experiment (Street and Burgess,
2007; Louviere et al., 2010). The experiment was designed to keep the sample size
requirements reasonable, while enabling estimation of desired effects with minimal
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interference from the design of the study (Kuhfeld, 2009). The collected data was
analyzed through a mixed multinomial logit model(McFadden and Train, 2000; Crois-
sant, 2013). The model allows us to control for user differences in user tastes without
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption. In this study, we specifically
look into the role of zero price in moderating the effectiveness of additional features.
Any product is a bundle of features, some of which directly effect the utility of the
product (such as ingredients and functionality) while others are more perceptual (such
as branding and packaging). We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that
there are differences in the effectiveness of utilitarian and non-utilitarian product
features in zero priced and paid products. The utilitarian features are enhanced by
zero price strategies, whereas same complementary effects are not observed in non
utilitarian features.
While the stated choice study is very strong in terms of cleanly identifying effect
of each variable, the experimental design can quickly grow out of control when
investigated relations get more complex (Kuhfeld, 2009). We found that experimentally
investigating network and branding effects was prohibitively expensive in terms of
sample size requirements. To overcome these limitations and to investigate these oft
overlooked relations, we expand upon the findings of this first study with a revealed
preferences study presented in Chapter 3. To obtain the dataset used in this study, we
developed and deployed a set of Python scripts on Amazon Web Services cloud. Using
these scripts to scrape publicly available data from the leading online gaming platform,
we obtained data on over 8000 users and 2500 games. We contribute to the literature
through investigation of alignments between network effects and software design. The
network effects in software can be broadly categorized as network externalities and
social influence (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Zhang
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et al., 2014; Singh and Phelps, 2009). While the former acts through the sheer size of
the user base, the later relies on direct user to user relations. The results revealed
that as a whole social features only enhanced the network externality effects but social
influence remained independent of the social features. In this study we also present
empirical evidence of brand loyalty in software markets. We found differences in the
significance of network effects and brand loyalty between the head and tail of the long
tail market.
Following the natural progression of the phenomena, Chapter 4 focuses on post
purchase use of software. Considering in today’s software market initial sale is just
the beginning of a long relation, the importance of usage as a matter of inquiry is
emphasized (Benbasat and Barki, 2007). To understand the continued use behavior,
this chapter focuses on strategies to increase user engagement with software. Developers
by allowing users to add features post purchase are extending the life of software
products (Erat and Bhaskaran, 2012). This add-on content strategy forms the second
pillar of freemium business model, where developers can monetize the free product. It
is also a way for developers to breathe new life into an otherwise stagnant or declining
product (Goldfarb, 2013). We investigated the role of base product features on add-on
content’s effect on user engagement. The engagement literature has informed this
inquiry (O’Brien and Toms, 2008). Whereby, we extend this literature by introducing
the role of add-on content, a hitherto overlooked dimension of continued engagement.
For this study, we gathered a unique dataset from a popular online gaming platform.
Python scripts deployed on Amazon Web Services cloud scraped daily data for over
7000 products through a year long period between February 2015 and February
2016. Considering the differentiation strategy used in hedonistic software goods, we
used a mixed effects model for analysis. This model allows me to model random
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coefficients for each product, thus controlling for differences between games. We found
complementarities between social design features and add-on content. It turns out
that social features have a multiplier effect on the effectiveness of add-on content.
Social features also enhanced the effect of innovative content. The products with novel
designs benefited more in a social setting.
Evaluated together, the three studies presented in this dissertation are aimed to
further our understanding of user behavior in software markets with a focus on the
recent developments in business models employed. In each study we tried to test the
boundaries of existing knowledge with an eye towards the complementary/substitutive
relations between business strategies -such as zero price and add-on content- and
circumstances surrounding the product -product features, consumer characteristics,
context effects. . . . The dissertation on the whole is not only deepening our academic
knowledge, but is highly relevant to practitioners because of the focus on alignment of
strategy with the evolving software market context.
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Chapter 2
MAKING A FREE PRODUCT AN EVEN BETTER DEAL
2.1 Introduction
Increased competition in the software markets are pushing developers more and
more to adopt business models based on zero price1 (Anderson, 2009; Niculescu and
Wu, 2010). These business models are so dominant that, 89% of all the apps on
Google Play store today are free (AppBrain, 2016), similar figures were also reported
for other online software stores. This shift to zero price business models has wide
reaching repercussions well beyond mobile app stores, as the software markets are
now integrated into operating systems (e.g. Mac App Store, Windows Store, Ubuntu
Software Center). Given the dominance of zero price strategies, it is imperative to
understand how free software can compete against other free and paid offerings.
An examination of zero price effects by Shampanier et al. (2007) found that
consumers tend to overreact to zero price. They found that the free products increased
the demand beyond what traditional models’ would have predicted. This seemingly
abnormal behavior was attributed to affect. That is, consumers started viewing
the transaction as a social exchange when the basis of economic transaction (price)
was taken out of the picture (Heyman and Ariely, 2004; Shampanier et al., 2007).
Although products examined in their studies did not involve software, the findings
have important consequences for software market since software products are especially
1Throughout this Chapter we use zero price and free interchangeably. When we use the word
free, we mean it as in free beer and not as in freedom.
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suited for zero price strategies due to negligible marginal production costs. Unlike
most traditional goods, producing an additional unit of a software product costs
almost nothing (Niculescu and Wu, 2010). Hence, zero price strategies in the software
domain are more prevalent.
In the software market, there are various business models built around the idea of
zero price, open source software2 being one of the oldest (Stallman, 1985) followed
closely by the more recent freemium approach (Niculescu and Wu, 2010), among others.
Open source is the practice of opening up the software development process to the
community so that everyone can be a part of the development effort. Most open source
products are freely available and research has found that beyond business transactions,
users of open source software are socially motivated (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006;
Stewart and Gosain, 2006; Singh and Tan, 2010) which aligns with Heyman and Ariely
(2004) social transaction argument. Freemium on the other hand is a more business
oriented strategy with an explicit revenue model built on premium features. The
base product is offered for free and the additional features are offered for a premium
(Ramaprasad and Papna, 2015; Zhang et al., 2014). The IS research on zero price
has focused on the effects of the free product offerings on the sales of the premium
products (Raghu et al., 2008; Choi et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011) or strategies to
increase sales of premium products (Oestreicher-Singer and Zalmanson, 2013; Bapna
and Umyarov, 2015).
As above discussion illustrates, the demand for the software product has been a
central concern to IS researchers. Users often evaluate the alternatives and choose
a product that they believe would best satisfy their needs. The software choice
2Stallman himself defines the movement he formed around opening source code and making it
available to all as Free Software movement. Open source is a later offshoot of this movement with
more business friendly applications.
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decisions however are not done in a vacuum, consumer characteristics and context as
well as feature composition of alternatives shape choice decisions. Prior research has
highlighted the role of users’ attitudes regarding price of software goods in determining
software demand (Lin et al., 2013). Similarly prior research has also found effect of
market context on demand. Baird et al. (2016) has identified differences in response
to free products in high tier markets compared to low tier markets. If ignored, these
effects may confound the effects of business strategy.
In this study we investigate hitherto overlooked dynamics of competition in the
presence of zero price alternatives from a demand perspective. We aim to understand
how developers can adjust the product features, to attract consumers with different
preferences and in different market segments. This study answers the following research
questions:
1. How do the product features complement zero price?
2. What is the role of consumer characteristics in determining demand for zero
price software?
3. What is the role of market context in determining the demand for zero price
software?
To address these questions we use social judgment theory (SJT) (Sherif and
Hovland, 1961) which is a broad decision making theory, that not only explains the
initial decision making but also the effect of learning and communication on subsequent
decisions. The SJT mechanisms provide us with the theoretical framework to bring
together the disparate variables of product features, consumer characteristics, and
context effects. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) for data collection, we were
able to observe relations that were harder to observe in secondary data sources (Street
and Burgess, 2007). The data was analyzed with a mixed multinomial logit model.
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The findings revealed that, features that enhance utility had a stronger (comple-
mentary) effect for free products than for paid products. Meaning the effect of moving
a feature from free version to the premium version will create asymmetrical effects
in demand, the demand for free product will go down further than the increase in
the demand of paid product. Furthermore, we found that zero price software was
more attractive in a high priced market. Meaning, paid versions may fare better in a
lower priced market such as mobile app stores as the users contrast away from paid
products in higher priced markets. This finding should be considered together with
the differential effects of features. The developers should adjust their offerings, in
terms of both pricing and feature set, based on market context. Finally we found that
the participants that associated price with quality were more likely to choose paid
software.
This study contributes to the IS literature on zero price products by investigating
the mechanisms shaping the competition between free products by quantifying the
role of product features, consumer characteristics, and context effects from a demand
side perspective. We demonstrate the SJT constructs of reference scales, anchoring,
and ego involvement in the software context with the introduction of software features
variables. The practical implications of this study will aid developers to better position
their products by allowing to engineer feature sets and pricing strategy to suit their
target market.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents an overview of relevant
literature and hypothesis development. Section 2.3 present the data collection and
analysis procedures. The results are presented in Section 2.4 and their discussion
concludes the chapter in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
A diverse body of research studies on consumer decision making has identified three
dimensions as formative in consumer choice: (1) product features (Mahajan et al.,
1982), (2) consumer characteristics (Sen et al., 2006; Schwarz and Schwarz, 2015), and
(3) context (Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Lehmann and Pan, 1994; Baird et al., 2016).
These dimensions were found to be shaping choice between alternatives. By bringing
the Social Judgment Theory (SJT) to this context, we can address all three choice
dimensions. SJT provides an explanation for preference formation and judgment
process (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). While the theory has broader implications than
what will be reported here, we mainly focus on core tenets of the theory that are
relevant to user decision making.
SJT suggests that, individuals form mental models of the situation based on their
prior knowledge and attitudes. These mental models are called reference scales. The
ideas/products are evaluated according to this reference scale. The regions of this
reference scale that are sufficiently close to the participant’s own position are termed
latitudes of acceptance. Participants will be more receptive towards the ideas/products
that fall within this range and they will be accepted/assimilated. The regions that
are further out are termed latitudes of rejection. The products falling into latitudes
of rejection will be rejected/contrasted. This assimilation/contrast mechanism can be
used to explain choice/rejection of products.
SJT discusses the effect of participant’s opinions on the evaluation process as ego
involvement. The more involved participants will have reference scales where latitudes
of acceptance is considerably narrower, leading them to reject a broader range of
options further away from their position.
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Certain ideas or products, such as extreme cases or reference cases, may have
greater influence in forming judgments of other cases (Sherif and Hovland, 1961).
These influential cases form the anchors on which the reference scale is positioned. If
the anchor is close to participants’ own position, we will see the participant shifting
their position towards the anchor, else the anchor will trigger contrast effects. This
anchoring mechanism can be used to explain context effects, wherein contextual cues
serve as anchors. Literature has used price structure and previous occupants as
contextual cues (Monroe et al., 1977; Meyers-Levy and Tybout, 1997).
SJT has been used extensively for evaluation of positions and products (Hammond
and Stewart, 1975; Cummings and Ostrom, 1982; Doherty and Kurz, 1996; Meyers-
Levy and Tybout, 1997). In this study we use SJT mechanisms to explain hypothesized
relations in the research model (See Figure 1). We organize the discussion along the
three dimensions of consumer choice discussed earlier. We start with the effects of
product features, followed by a discussion of individual characteristics, and conclude
the discussion of hypotheses by analyzing the context effects.
2.2.1 Product Features
Literature treats product features as utilitarian and non-utilitarian features
(Richardson et al., 1994). Utilitarian features directly relate to intrinsic product
quality. Non-utilitarian features, on the other hand, relate more to the perceptions
regarding the product and hence have an indirect effect on quality perceptions. We
start the discussion with the utilitarian product features that directly tie into the
quality, then move onto non-utilitarian product features.
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Figure 1. Research Framework
The traditional utilitarian thinking posits that individuals choose alternatives that
maximize their utility. In this framework, the net utility, U = V −C. Where V is the
intrinsic benefit obtained from the product, and C is the cost of acquiring product.
The zero price effect as described in Shampanier et al. (2007) posits that the net
utility of zero priced product increases by a factor α, i.e., U = V + α.
We extend this basic line of reasoning to a product with multiple features as follows.
First, we define utility of the multi-featured product as a multiplicative function to
represent a complementary relationship. The utility of free product (Uf ) and utility
of paid product (Up) are therefore defined as below.
Up = V f − C, Uf = (V + α)f (2.1)
Now, Assume two levels of features, f0 and f1 such that f1 > f0. The change
in utility for a non-zero and zero priced products are then given by the following
expressions.
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∆Up = V (f1 − f0), ∆Uf = (V + α)(f1 − f0), clearly ∆Uf > ∆Up (2.2)
The zero price effect is generally attributed to the increased affect towards the
zero priced product. Affect is known to induce more positive evaluation of neutral
items and increase variety seeking behavior (Isen et al., 1978; Kahn and Isen, 1993).
More importantly, Affect is known to alter the perceived relationship between risk
and benefit (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000). A “liked” product in
an affective situation is perceived as less risky as well as more beneficial. This is in
contrast to the rational valuation models where higher risk is associated with higher
benefits. Therefore, in the context of Social Judgment Theory, affect results in the
widening of latitudes of acceptance. In a multi-featured product context, affect would
lead the neutral attributes of product features to be viewed more positively and in
turn will lead to a greater increase in assimilation. The paid products with the same
feature benefits, without the affective evaluations, will not benefit from this additional
increase in assimilation. As such, we conclude that affective valuation engendered by
zero price will lead to a widening of the assimilation space. More importantly, we
argue that increased feature availability increases benefit profile of the zero priced
product more than that for the non-zero priced product.
Hypothesis 1. Adding product features will increase demand more for free software
in comparison to paid software.
Even though additional features that directly influence the benefits derived from
the product can increase utility through affect mechanism, we still need to establish
how product features that provide indirect benefits impact utility (Richardson et al.,
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1994). The literature on zero price is unclear as to this distinction between product
features that have direct vs. indirect benefits.
An example of indirect product features with indirect benefits can be ethical
considerations. Ethical consumption cues such as fair trade, environmentally friendly,
or post-consumer labels are often considered to be positive features of products even
though they do not directly provide consumption benefits (Davis, 1993; Pelsmacker
et al., 2005). Consumers motivated by social causes can shape their choices based on
these ethical cues. Such examples are also found in software markets. For example,
open source software and open licensing are viewed as positive attributes for a software
product by many consumers (Gwebu and Wang, 2011). This is despite the fact
that most users never inspect or contribute to the code base to derive any explicit
benefit from open source (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003), yet these consumers are
motivated to take part due to social reasons (Stewart and Gosain, 2006; Gwebu and
Wang, 2011).
While the literature does not explicitly specify how indirect product features
impact utility considerations, it has been observed that the ethical consumption cues
contribute to increased willingness to pay (Pelsmacker et al., 2005). We hypothesize
that such non-utilitarian features will act like utilitarian features (i.e, with direct
consumption benefits). As per discussion of Hypothesis 1, affective evaluations
triggered by utilitarian features are expected to enhance the increase in assimilation
due to the feature. We expect a similar increase in assimilation due to affect to play
out in non-utilitarian product features as well. As such, open source licenses will be
perceived more positively in zero price context than they are in the paid context due
to the affective evaluations triggered by zero price.
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Hypothesis 2. Open source licenses are more preferable in free products than they
are in paid products.
2.2.2 User Characteristics
SJT posits that people will evaluate the issues that are more important to them-
selves differently from those that they are less concerned about. The centrality of an
issue is termed “ego involvement” in SJT and is determined by an individuals’ beliefs,
attitudes and social outlook. These aspects “. . . become the regulating bases for
individual’s evaluation . . .” (Sherif and Hovland, 1961, p. 37), thus shaping the
reference scale. The people with high ego involvement would have broader latitudes
of rejection and narrower latitudes of acceptance on issues that are more important
to them. On the other hand, individuals reject a wider variety of positions away
from their own when there is high ego involvement. We isolate such effects based on
price-quality perceptions and collectivism in the following paragraphs.
In our research context, price and associated perceptions of quality is highly
relevant as a factor in consumers’ evaluations and therefore ego involvement. In the
context of zero priced software, literature has found that the users’ expectation for
software price effects the willingness to pay and consequently the demand (Raghu
et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2013). The price quality perceptions (PQP) is the customer’s
perceptions of prices in relation to quality and “what it signals to others about the
purchaser” (Lichtenstein et al., 1993). Individuals that associate price with quality
and prestige tend to be more willing to pay higher prices.
The participants high on beliefs associating price to quality or prestige will put
price at a more central position in their decision making. These participants will have
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positions closer to paid products (Cummings and Ostrom, 1982; Beatty et al., 1988).
We expect the participants that associate quality and prestige with price to find paid
products to be closer to their own position on the reference scales and assimilate
towards those, while contrasting away from free products.
Hypothesis 3. Users who associate price with higher quality or prestige are more
likely to select paid products than to select zero priced products.
Prior research has found social perspective to be salient in participation in OSS
communities, such as social identity (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2006; Gwebu and Wang,
2011), social relations (Singh and Tan, 2010), and even ideology (Stewart and Gosain,
2006). While identity or ideology may shape the more involved process of participation
in development of OSS, for the question of choice of end user software, we believe
the antecedents of social identity/ideology will be more appropriate. Individualism
and collectivism determine how individuals identify themselves and are antecedents
of social identity (Oyserman et al., 2002; Brewer and Chen, 2007). Hence, we use
collectivism —propensity to define oneself as part of a group and put emphasis on
group relations (Singelis et al., 1995)— to investigate how social leanings shape choice
in the context of zero priced software.
Since, open source software is developed and used by a community (O’Mahony
and Ferraro, 2007), the participants high on collectivism will have a social outlook
where community development will be more central to their decision making. These
participants will have personal positions closer to OSS and will have broader latitudes
of rejection for proprietary software. We expect the collectivistic participants to
assimilate OSS, and contrast proprietary software.
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Hypothesis 4. More communal users are more likely to select OSS than to select
proprietary products.
2.2.3 Context Effects
The final dimension of choice we investigate in this study is the context effects.
We utilize the main tenets of SJT’s anchoring mechanisms to describe how context
effects manifest in choice decisions. Anchors are influential observations that shape the
reference scales used in evaluation (Sherif and Hovland, 1961, pp. 44-47). It is possible
to shift individuals’ positions by appropriately presenting specific anchors. When
an anchor is within latitudes of acceptance, individuals’ position assimilates (shifts)
towards the anchor. Conversely, if an anchor is provided in latitudes of rejection we
see contrast effects (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Meyers-Levy and Sternhal, 1993).
Given the role of open source software in the competition between zero priced
software highlighted above, we are interested in how more traditional licensing ap-
proaches shape demand for software. Prior studies into the effect of context has found
that similarity between context and stimuli leads to assimilation effects (Herr, 1989;
Huang and Washington, 2015; Stapel and Winkielman, 1998). In a context where
OSS licenses are mainstream, OSS products will be similar to the context. Familiarity
with OSS will serve as an anchor, shifting the personal position, towards OSS. People
in a context where OSS is better known will assimilate OSS products more readily.
Hypothesis 5. In contexts where OSS is mainstream, it is more preferable.
In addition to familiarity, we posit that prevailing price levels will serve as another
anchor in choice decisions. Market price levels can be an especially effective context
anchor when zero priced alternatives are introduced. Prior research has found free
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products were received differently in high priced versus low priced contexts (Baird
et al., 2016). The nature of price levels allow us to test the SJT proposition of
achieving contrast effects through anchors (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Meyers-Levy
and Sternhal, 1993). When the market price level is in the latitudes of rejection, the
participants should contrast the paid products. Meaning, free products will look more
appealing in a high price market, than it does in a low price market.
Hypothesis 6. Free products are more preferable in the high price context than in
low price context.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Experimental Design
Preferences of products are often measured through either a revealed preference
(Lee and Tan, 2013) or a stated preference study (Raghu et al., 2008). Revealed
preference studies are conducted on secondary data, and stated preference studies
are conducted on experimental data. While both methods have their advantages,
the stated choice methods give researchers greater control over the stimuli, allowing
designs that highlight the effect of each variable more clearly and test what if scenarios
(Street and Burgess, 2007).
It is difficult to observe choice among alternatives in data sources used in revealed
preferences studies. The alternatives evaluated before a decision are often unobservable
and certain factors the researchers are interested in may not have variance. The Apple
app store, for example, does not have open source software (Vaughan-Nichols, 2011).
Stated choice approach we use avoids such issues (Street and Burgess, 2007).
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The specific stated choice method we choose is called discrete choice experiment
(DCE) (Louviere et al., 2010). In DCE, the participants are offered a set of products
–a choice set– and are instructed to pick one. As the products vary in terms of their
features, the user’s choice reveals the utility of each feature. The DCE we designed
for this study allow us to control the choice set the users evaluated to an extent not
possible in secondary data, allowing us to observe, without noise, the effect of each
variable more clearly (Kuhfeld, 2009). The variables of interest were discussed in the
previous section. We used these variables as between or within subjects depending
on the research questions we were trying to answer. In the DCE employed in this
study, we had three within subjects variables for product features and two between
subjects features for context, all at two levels (see Table 1). Additionally, to test
the hypotheses associated with user characteristics, we also administered two survey
scales to measure consumer characteristics regarding price quality perceptions (PQP)
(Lichtenstein et al., 1993) and collectivism (Singelis et al., 1995).
The within subjects variables used in this study were: software license’s source
code (open, closed) and payment (free, paid) provisions and collaborative editing
function (present, absent). Given the 2x2x2 structure of the within subjects factors,
there are 8 possible combinations of these attributes making up 8 different products.
The eight products in our design can be combined in sets of three products, thus
allowing 56 possible choice sets 3. From a practical point of view, exposing the
participants to all 56 choice sets is not viable. Thus, we opted for a fractional factorial
design to select an efficient subset of the available choice sets that reduced the sample
size requirements but ensured high efficiency in the experimental design.
3
(
8
3
)
= 8!3!(8−3)! = 56
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Variables Description
Within Subjects Variables
Paid Binary variable describing product pricing. 0 for free, 1 for paid.
Collab Product has collaborative features (1) or no collaborative features (0).
Source Source code provisions. 0 for open source, 1 for closed source.
Between Subjects Variables
Price Price of the paid products. 0 for price = $25, 1 for price = $150
Exposure Exposure of subjects to open source. 1 exposed, 0 not.
Table 1. Variables manipulated in the experiment.
The goal of the efficient experiment design is to minimize the correlations caused
by the design of experimental stimuli and to increase the amount of information
extracted per observation (Kuhfeld, 2009). Two dimensions of an efficient design are,
balance and orthogonality. A balanced design indicates that each level of each variable
occurs in the design equally frequently. An orthogonal design indicates any pair of
levels occur equally frequently. To clarify with an example, if all of the open source
products in the data set are also free, open source and free will be confounded and
we will not be able to know if correlations in the data is caused by the design of the
experiment or the preferences of users for free or open source software. By having a
balanced and orthogonal design, it is possible to minimize the effect of experimental
design on correlations.
A D-efficient choice design that is both balanced and orthogonal was constructed
(Kuhfeld, 2009). The design produced 8 choice sets that allow us to estimate all main
and two way interaction effects with a high relative D efficiency (0.88). Correlation
structure was satisfactory with no canonical correlations above 0.3 and near 0 corre-
lation coefficients on all off diagonal elements of the choice set design (Please refer
to Appendix A.2 for the covariance matrix of the design and Appendix A.1 for the
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choice sets obtained through this design). The generated choice sets were presented to
participants in random order to minimize fatigue and ordering effects. To control for
context effects, we randomly assigned the participants into one of the four conditions
described by the two levels of between subjects variables.
2.3.2 Instrument Design
We developed an online survey to collect data. The participants were asked to
imagine a scenario that involved selecting a graphics design software for a course
they were planning to take. The participants were told the instructor provided
them with alternatives that were functionally adequate to carry out the assignments,
but the software differed. This ensured the perceptions of various product features
manipulated changed the product evaluations. All participants were informed that
the course involved some amount of group work.
2.3.2.1 Context Effects
To control for context effects, we devised two binary conditions: market price
level and exposure to open source. The 2x2 nature of context variables created
four conditions. We then randomly assigned participants to these conditions. For
the exposure to open source condition, the participants were presented with three
headlines from major technology web sites regarding open source software. Subjects
in the non-exposure group were not shown any headlines. The headlines were chosen
to from news of corporate open source initiatives that supported the sense that open
source was mainstream. Please refer to Appendix A.3, for headlines used in this
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manipulation. The price of paid products were set to $150 in high price condition,
whereas it was set to $25 in the low price condition. We choose such different prices
to ensure contrast effects. These context variables formed the first set of between
subjects variables.
2.3.2.2 Product Features
Each participant reviewed products that differed in price, license type, and addi-
tional features (refer to Table 1). Each product feature variable was modeled as binary.
As discussed in the experiment design section, there were eight products defined by
these three features for the participants to evaluate. These product attributes formed
the within subjects variables we used in this study.
2.3.2.3 User Characteristics
To control for user characteristics, we used well established survey scales from
Handbook of Marketing Scales (Bearden and Netemeyer, 2011). We used price quality
schema for price quality perceptions (Lichtenstein et al., 1993) and collectivism scales
(Singelis et al., 1995) for individual vs. group orientation. Since the same individual
evaluated 8 product sets, the individual covariates gathered through these survey
items formed the second set of between subjects variables.
To ensure data quality, we integrated three attention checks into the survey. The
first attention check was introduced right after the instructions and questioned the
participants on their understanding of the instructions by asking two simple true/false
questions. Second attention check was presented in the form of a choice question. The
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participant was presented with three products to choose from, but the instructions
required the participant to to select a specific product, rather than the one they
desired. The participant that chose any other product at this step was assumed to
have not read the instructions carefully. Finally, the same questions from the first
attention check was reintroduced after the collection of individual covariates. Any
participant that failed a single attention check was not allowed to progress further.
This was done to ensure fairness, as the failed participants were not paid and having
participants continue on a task for no pay was deemed unethical.
The data used in this study brought together alternative variant (product features)
and alternative invariant (between subjects manipulations and participant characteris-
tics) variables in a repeated measures setting. Each participant was exposed to eight
choice sets composed of three products and selected a product out of each choice set.
Figure 2 details the data collection process.
Two pilot studies with undergraduate students (sample size of each was over 400)
was conducted to refine the experimental design and survey instruments used in
measuring consumer characteristics. We made sure reliability (Cronbach’s alpha was
above .90) and validity (CFA results adhering to heuristics suggested by Straub and
Gefen (2004)) of our survey instruments were satisfactory. Based on pilot study results
we dropped the reverse coded items of the PQP scale due to unidimensionality, which
is typical of scales with reverse coded items (Deemer, 1999).
For the data used in the main study we recruited participants from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). Prior literature has found AMT to be comparable to
consumer panels and lab experiments (Mason and Suri, 2012; Steelman et al., 2014).
Following Steelman et al. (2014), participation was limited to North America.
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Figure 2. Data Collection Process
2.3.3 Analysis
Considering the categorical nature of the dependent variable, various analysis
methods can be utilized. Conditional logit and multinomial logit models are frequently
used in literature for choice experiments (Aizaki and Nishimura, 2008; Kuhfeld, 2009).
We chose a mixed multinomial logit model to analyze the data. The advantage of
this model over alternatives is that it allows for subject level heterogeneity and allows
integrating between subjects variables along with within subjects variables (Train,
2009). This makes the model ideal to answer our research questions regarding effects of
product features (within subjects), context effects and user effects (between subjects).
An added benefit of the model is that this model does not suffer from independent of
irrelevant alternatives assumption.
The empirical approach utilizes the random utility model where utility of a product
is given by zij = α′wij + β′ixij + ij. The observations come from two levels (level
1) products (j) in choice sets (c) evaluated by (level 2) respondents (i). In this
specification, wij is the covariate vector and xij is the design vector for random
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effects. α is the vector for unknown fixed regression parameters and β is the vector for
unknown random regression parameters. ij is iid extreme value and, along with terms
in the xij , forms the stochastic component of utility. The random effects are calculated
for xij = (Paidij, Sourceij, Featij). The random coefficients βi are assumed to be
uniformly distributed.
The dependent variable in these models is choice (y). It is assumed that choice is
determined by the utilities of each of the alternatives to the participant. The probability
of selection for each product by the individual is calculated via multinomial probability
function. Probability is derived by comparing the utility of each product for the
individual to the total utility of all products in choice set for the same individual. The
higher the comparative utility, the more likely the selection. The model predicts the
probability of yijc = 1 (selecting a product) conditional on the random effects β.
The logit specification is used to determine probability of selecting one product
over others giving us the conditional probability:
P (yijc = 1|β) = e
zijc∑j
k=1 ezikc
(2.3)
Through the density function f(β) we obtain the unconditional probability.
P (yijc = 1) =
ezijc∑j
k=1 ezikc
f(β)d(β) (2.4)
2.4 Results
1283 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers attempted the survey. To ensure data
quality, the participants were not allowed to continue if they failed any of the three
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attention checks4. 555 observations were thus rejected. Prior research has found
relation between completion time and accuracy of responses (Meade and Craig, 2012).
The survey included over 1800 words in questions and instructions, hence should
take longer than three minutes to read. Average completion time was seven minutes,
based on this, we further eliminated responses that were completed in less than three
minutes. Causing the exclusion of another 44 responses. In the end, we were left with
686 usable responses. Considering the subject pool, task difficulty, and the hidden
attention checks, the usable sample size was deemed acceptable.
In our sample, 58% of the participants were male, 27% were between the ages
18 and 25 (See Appendix A.4). Since most of the experimental variables used in
this study were binary and were administered through a balanced and orthogonal
design, the binary independent variables are presented equally frequently. Hence, the
descriptive statistics for variables of interest are not presented here.
Table 2 presents the results of estimation. With a conditional logit model (Model
1) as the starting point, we allowed for the participants to have heterogeneous tastes
on product features (Model 2). Considering the binary nature of the product feature
variables, we modeled user tastes as uniformly distributed. In a uniform distribution,
variance is given by the span of the distribution hence we report the span instead
of standard deviation for random coefficients. Next, we added the product feature
interactions in Model 3. The context effects and user characteristics were added in
Models 4 and 5 respectively. Likelihood ratio tests suggest that the fit improves
significantly with the addition of each set of variables. The results show that signs
4This is typical in AMT, since the workers are not paid when they fail a task, it is considered
unfair to keep spending their time on a failed task.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Free 2.229 (0.076)∗∗∗ 4.865 (0.173)∗∗∗ 3.994 (0.230)∗∗∗ 6.706 (0.432)∗∗∗ 6.033 (0.438)∗∗∗
Feat 2.737 (0.070)∗∗∗ 7.157 (0.266)∗∗∗ 6.510 (0.285)∗∗∗ 6.805 (0.296)∗∗∗ 6.607 (0.288)∗∗∗
Open 1.042 (0.041)∗∗∗ 1.777 (0.087)∗∗∗ 1.642 (0.128)∗∗∗ 1.017 (0.425)∗ 0.844 (0.433)
Free x Feat 1.206 (0.253)∗∗∗ 1.130 (0.254)∗∗∗ 1.121 (0.255)∗∗∗
Free x Open 0.205 (0.137) 0.187 (0.137) 0.177 (0.138)
Free x PQP −0.899 (0.109)∗∗∗ −0.872 (0.110)∗∗∗
Open x Comm 0.177 (0.111) 0.152 (0.111)
Open x Exposure 0.624 (0.135)∗∗∗
Free x PriceBtw 1.350 (0.176)∗∗∗
span Free 6.315 (0.288)∗∗∗ 6.348 (0.286)∗∗∗ 6.363 (0.286)∗∗∗ 6.381 (0.292)∗∗∗
span Feat 7.940 (0.362)∗∗∗ 8.009 (0.365)∗∗∗ 8.222 (0.374)∗∗∗ 7.960 (0.364)∗∗∗
span Open 3.233 (0.185)∗∗∗ 3.263 (0.185)∗∗∗ 3.284 (0.188)∗∗∗ 3.312 (0.188)∗∗∗
AIC 7129.171 4955.511 4937.806 4919.684 4893.650
Log Likelihood −3561.585 −2471.755 −2460.903 −2449.842 −2434.825
Num. obs. 5336 5336 5336 5336 5336
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2. Mixed Multinomial Logit Results
and significance levels are qualitatively consistent across models, thus we will present
the results of Model 5.
Table 3 shows the change in the predicted probability of getting selected among
three products when the binary independent variable is incremented 1 unit while
all other variables are fixed at mean levels. In effect, this shows the change in
attractiveness of the focal product in comparison to two average products (all features
fixed at mean levels) when a feature of focal product is changed. Looking at marginal
effects at means of product features we found that going from closed source to open
source meant a 38% increase in selection probability. Changing from paid to free
on the other hand, increased the selection probability by 81%. Adding collaborative
editing feature increased the probability by 93%.
Examining Table 3, we can also see that Hypothesis 1, effect of additional features
enhanced in free context, is supported. Adding a feature causes a greater increase in
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Main Effects Change in Probability
Switching from paid to free 0.81
Adding a feature 0.93
Switching from closed to open source 0.38
Interactions Change in Probability
Paid Product Adding a feature 0.53
Free Product Adding a feature 0.89
Exposed to OSS Closed to Open Source 0.44
Not Exposed to OSS Closed to Open Source 0.32
Low Price Context Paid to Free 0.75
High Price Context Paid to Free 0.86
Table 3. Impact of product features under different contexts
predicted probability for free products (0.89) than for paid products (0.53). Hypothesis
2 , effect of open source licenses enhanced in the free context, is not supported as the
interaction term between free and open as seen in Table 2 is insignificant.
Figure 3 shows the change in probability caused by a one unit increment in
independent variable for high (mean +1 standard deviation) and low (mean -1 standard
deviation) levels of continuous variable. The figure shows that participants high on
price quality perceptions were 3% more likely to choose paid software, lending support
to Hypothesis 3. Since the Open x Collectivism interaction is insignificant Hypothesis
4 was not supported, and the relation was not plotted.
As we predicted in Hypothesis 5, familiarity with open source software makes OSS
products more acceptable. Participants in open source anchoring condition were 8%
more likely to select open source products compared to the mean product. Finally,
free software is more attractive in high price settings as predicted in Hypothesis 6, as
the free software was about 9% more preferable in high price setting.
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Figure 3. PQP interaction visualized
Hypotheses Description Status
H 1 Adding features has a stronger effect for free products. Supported
H 2 Open source licenses have a stronger effect for free products. Not Supported
H 3 Participants high on PQP prefer paid products to free products Supported
H 4 Participants high on collectivism prefer OSS products. Not Supported
H 5 OSS products are more acceptable in open source familiar context. Supported
H 6 Free products are more attractive in high price context. Supported
Table 4. Status of Hypothesis for Stated Choice Study
We used random effects to integrate individual heterogeneities and to model
differences in consumer tastes5. By allowing each participant to have a different slope
for within subjects variables, we account for differences between customer tastes for
each feature. The mean of these random coefficients give the population estimate,
while the spread tells us about the nature of customer heterogeneity (see Figure 4).
While free products were preferred on average, we found 11% of the participants
preferred paid software. Still lower figures were found for additional features. We
found that only about 5% of the participants preferred products with fewer features.
Open source licensing, on the other hand, showed great heterogeneity, as 22% of our
participants preferred closed source products.
5We used Model 2 in interpreting random effects to isolate the effects of interaction terms.
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Figure 4. Random effects visualized
2.5 Limitations
To provide a proper context for interpreting the study results, we discuss some
limitations of the study design. First, an end-user product was used in this study
with typical individual users as participants, and the results may not generalize into
corporate settings. Although end-users are being granted more and more freedom in
selecting the tools they use, the decision of enterprise systems choice can be beyond
the end-users. Hence caution should be taken in generalizing the results to corporate
settings. Second, we used data from Amazon Mechanical Turk participants. Although
there is evidence in literature that AMT participants are a reliable source of data
(Crump et al., 2013; Steelman et al., 2014) questions regarding reliability of our
data can be raised. To alleviate this concern, we refined the experimental design
through two pilot studies with student samples (for which the task was realistic),
the results from pilot studies agree with what is presented here to a great extent,
yet the relation between open source and collectivism that was significant in pilot
studies turned insignificant in main dataset. If anything, the results reported here
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are conservative in the sense that the pilot and the main studies agree on significant
relations. Third, branding is a significant factor in software markets, yet we opted for
a generic (unbranded) discrete choice experiment in this study to avoid methodological
complications. Future research may want to focus on how brand awareness affect
choice.
2.6 Conclusion
Motivated by recent changes in the software market, we investigated the factors
shaping competition in the presence of zero priced alternatives. Surviving in this
competitive landscape requires developers to understand and react to the effects of free
software on consumer choice. This study presents a pioneering effort into uncovering
the underlying mechanism of the competition dynamics in software markets. Using a
discrete choice experiment, we were able to uncover hard to observe complementarities
between common zero price strategies in the software markets, consumer characteristics,
and market context. We contribute to the literature by expanding Social Judgment
Theory in software choice context. The study demonstrates that SJT mechanisms
of anchoring, ego involvement, and reference scales can be used to explain software
choice.
The finding of complementarities between free products and additional features has
important implications in designing software offerings. First and foremost, we found
that utilitarian features and non-utilitarian features do not work the same way. While
utilitarian features increase the demand further for free products, the non-utilitarian
features do not enjoy this complementary effect beyond the main effect. Second, the
complementarities between utilitarian features and zero price means that taking a
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feature from a free product and moving it to a paid product, when all else being held
constant, will have asymmetrical effects on the two products . The increase in demand
for the paid version will be smaller than the reduction in demand for the free version.
Developers should take this effect into account when selecting feature sets of free and
paid software. These results are especially relevant for freemium strategies. As this
complementarity was notably absent in the case of non-utilitarian features such as
software licensing terms. That is, beyond the direct effect of software license type, the
developers need not consider the pricing structure in selecting non-utilitarian features
such as license type.
The results demonstrate the significant role of ego involvement in consumer
reactions to product features. The results revealed that individuals’ evaluations
change with the centrality of issues to their judgment. Price being a central concern of
many participants, we found that price-quality perceptions have an effect on demand
of free software. The participants that associated price with quality are less likely to
choose free software as can be seen in Figure 3 not found. Taking this finding together
with price heterogeneities (See Figure 4, 10% of participants prefer paid software)
reveals opportunities for product positioning. When designing product offerings,
developers should position their product in accordance with the characteristics of their
target market. For instance, when competing against paid products, emphasizing
quality can increase the attractiveness of free products for this sub population. The
findings regarding OSS anchoring supports such an approach, as it demonstrates that
communications can serve as an anchor and shift personal preferences. This means
that the market can be made more amenable to certain types of products through
advertisement and communication campaigns.
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The hypothesis of the effect of collectivism on open source preferences however
was not supported. We believe this may be due to OSS not being a central issue
to collectivist participants. As the AMT users’ ego involvement in the case of open
source is low, even the collectivist AMT users may not be able to see the relevance of
OSS to the community. The collectivism/OSS relation is still worth investigating in
other contexts though. Rather than a general audience, testing this hypothesis on a
more focused OSS users group may yield differing results. Unfortunately, this is out
of the scope of this study.
In this study we tried to provide a comprehensive investigation of end-user choice
in zero price context. Using SJT to bring together the three dimensions of choice, we
were able to investigate the effects of product characteristics, user characteristics and
context effects together. This study revealed some interesting relations to pursue. The
difference between interaction of zero price and utilitarian and non-utilitarian features
for example merits further inquiry. While we rely on Shampanier et al. (2007) for a
possible explanation, exact mechanisms in play can not be fully explained through our
experiments. Future research into the exact nature of this relation will be beneficial.
Another dimension we believe would merit further inquiry is brand effects in software
markets. To the best of our knowledge this is an area IS researchers have mostly
ignored. Uncovering how certain brands influence the effects of product features would
be a worthwhile inquiry especially as products are positioned within platforms and/or
sold in bundles. The discrete choice experiments used in this study is perfectly suited
for this purpose.
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Chapter 3
PURCHASING IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL PLENTY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter builds upon the preceding chapter by investigating the post choice
purchasing phenomenon from a revealed preferences perspective. The focus is also
shifted more towards the network effects and branding which were hard to establish
experimentally. As established in Chapter 2, choice in the presence of alternatives
is the new frontier in software markets both for business and for consumer settings.
This trend is evidenced with the rise of mobile computing and bring your own devices
among others (Harris et al., 2012). Software markets are moving towards “highly
heterogeneous consumer oriented” contexts. As a result, users today have greater
freedom in choosing software. There have long been calls in the IS community to
switch from the traditional mandatory IS settings to more voluntary use contexts
(Benbasat and Barki, 2007). With the shift in the software markets, this need is more
salient than ever. Especially in consumer-oriented software markets, the decision
making responsibility has shifted to the consumers. In these new market settings,
characterized by the plethora of choices catering to the wide array of heterogeneous
user preferences, choice and subsequent purchasing behavior becomes highly salient.
Prior work has illustrated that freedom of choice has a significant effect on user
decision making (Murray and Häubl, 2011). While there is a significant body of
work on consumer choice in related disciplines, the IS research has only recently
begun addressing how consumers make software choices in the presence of alternatives
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(Schwarz and Schwarz, 2009; Murray and Häubl, 2011; Schwarz and Schwarz, 2015).
Due to unique characteristics of software product –such as, software licenses and
susceptibility to network effects– there are opportunities for theory building and
testing new boundaries for existing theories. We investigated choice phenomenon in
Chapter 2, and now we are moving on to subsequent purchasing behavior. Software
products are more susceptible to social influence than most traditional products and
goods (Stewart et al., 2006). With this as a starting point, we aim to better understand
the role of social influence and network externalities in software purchasing decision
setting.
Traditionally choice has been investigated either with an experimental stated
preference approach or with a secondary data revealed preference approach (Street
and Burgess, 2007). Each approach has its advantages. The stated preference
study gives researchers greater control over the variables and enable testing what if
scenarios, whereas the revealed preference studies with real world data provide more
generalizable insights. In order to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation,
we implemented both approaches. In Chapter 2 we presented a stated preference
study into end-user choice in software markets. In this Chapter, we will be presenting
results from a revealed preference study that complements and adds to our stated
preference findings. We acknowledged the limitations of the discrete choice experiment
implemented in our first study as follows. Experimental design limited our ability to
effectively test network effects. It was difficult to investigate branding effects without
a more complicated experimental design. Most importantly it was difficult to simulate
purchase behavior that would occur in a context where a large number of products
exist to choose from. This study furthers our inquiry with a revealed preferences
study.
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A software product, beyond the market context studied in Chapter 2 is also defined
by the context created by the software itself. Network and brand effects are two
dimensions of this self created context. The software is affected by network of users
surrounding it and its own brand perceptions. Network effects can be considered in
two broad categories: Influence of a user’s immediate network is called social influence
(Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Robins et al., 2001; Singh and Phelps, 2009), and effect of
the overall network on users’ enjoyment is called network externalities (Farrell and
Saloner, 1986; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996). Developers can alter the design of
their software to increase the effect of network effects through features that enable
user to user interactions Gandal (1995); Brynjolfsson et al. (2011); Cheng et al. (2011).
In Chapter 2 we studied interaction between product features and context, here we
specifically focus on the moderating role of social features on network effects. In this
Chapter we aim to answer the following research questions: (1) In the age of digital
plenty, to what extent do network effects influence purchasing propensity of consumers?
(2) Do social features moderate network effects? In answering these questions we take
into account the nature of the market and the products by controlling for the brand
loyalty and long tail effects.
The digital games are especially suited to study end-user purchasing behavior.
Games form a sizable portion of digital market places as entertainment products are
one of the most demanded product categories (AppBrain, 2016). Another advantage
of game market is that the consumer decision making is mainly driven by personal
choice and external factors such as business requirements do not influence the choice,
hence games provide a clear look at motivations behind purchasing decisions.
To obtain the data used in this study, we developed and deployed a set of Python
scripts on amazon web services cloud. We choose a leading online games distribution
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platform, Steam, for data collection. Steam currently controls 70% of the digital
gaming distribution market, and has over 125 million active users (Sherif, 2015; Chiang,
2011). The data was analyzed with conditional logit model. Our most significant
finding is revealing differences in the effectiveness of network effects in the head and
tail of the long tail market. We found that the products in the head of the market
relied on external factors rather than network externalities or social influence. Still,
effect of network externalities were enhanced products with social features in this
segment. Conversely, the products in the tail with social features saw a dampening of
the effect of their social features. No such interaction was observed for social influence.
Meaning social features act upon network externalities and not on social influence.
This study contributes to the IS literature in a few significant ways; (1) We
study the purchasing behavior with secondary data from one of the largest online
software markets, (2) We investigate the relation between components of network
effects, namely the social influence and network externalities, and social features. (3)
In this study we reveal differences in segments of the long tail market with regards to
the effect of network externalities and social influence.
The Chapter is structured as follows: We present a review of relevant literature
in Section 3.2. The methods used in data collection and analysis are discussed in
Section 3.3. Next, the results are presented. Finally the chapter is concluded with a
discussion of results.
3.2 Literature Review
The social judgment theory, the idea of influencing judgments through social
processes later gave rise to the literature on social influence (Sherif and Hovland, 1961;
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Robins et al., 2001). The basic premise of social influence is, that people we are close
with influence our decisions. IS literature has investigated social influence in both
acceptance research (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000; Venkatesh and Morris, 2000) and in
social network studies (Singh and Phelps, 2009).
While psychology literature focused on social influence, economics literature has
developed a related but distinct concept, network externalities. Instead of looking at
effects of social structure, the economics literature took on a more utilitarian approach
and investigated marginal impact of an additional user on utility of all others (Katz
and Shapiro, 1985). Network effects can operate through social influence of close peers
or through network externalities. IS literature has identified certain features, such as
compatibility of file formats and user interfaces, as able to alter the effects of network
effects (Gandal, 1995; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Dou et al., 2013). There is
paucity of evidence as to how software design influences the effects of network effects.
Evidence is mostly from analytical studies and empirical evidence is sparse (Liu et al.,
2011; Cheng et al., 2011; Dou et al., 2013).
Software as a product is highly susceptible to network externalities (Brynjolfsson
and Kemerer, 1996). In case of network externalities, the utility of each user is a
function of the user base of the product (Cheng et al., 2011). Let us assume that in
absence of externalities, the utility of each product is U = V − C. Where V is the
intrinsic benefit obtained from the product, and C is the cost of acquiring product.
The network externality is such that, the more users use the product, the greater the
benefit. Hence, in presence of externalities the utility would be: U = V (γθ)−C, where
γ is the intensity of network externalities, and θ is the user base of the product.IS
literature has a long history of using certain features –such as file format compatibility,
UI similarity, collaborative editing, multiplayer– as proxy to estimate network effects
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(Gandal, 1995; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996). While these features serve as useful
if not perfect proxies for network effects, in reality they enable and enhance network
effects through social interactions and utility spillovers of network externalities (Dou
et al., 2013). The intensity of the network externalities can be engineered through
careful design (Dou et al., 2013). The social features that facilitate user interactions
will increase γ, hence increasing overall utility derived from the user base θ.
Unlike network externality effects, social influence works through direct links
between users (Katona et al., 2011). So unlike the size of the user base, the structure
of the network comes into play for social influence. The immediate network of others a
user is connected to, gives the user a chance to learn from others’ behavior (McFadden
and Train, 1996; Singh and Phelps, 2009). Products that have features that facilitate
interactions between users will increase the chances to observe others. Hence, social
features can enhance the effect of social influence.
It is crucial to note the long tail phenomenon in any analysis of digital market
places (Anderson, 2004; Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Lee and Raghu, 2014). While a
few major hits still account for majority of sales, the niche products also find an
audience in these digital markets. The literature argues this is due to unlimited shelf
space on the supply side and reduced search costs on the demand side (Brynjolfsson
et al., 2006). Still the market dynamics are quite different between the tail and the
head. While the head enjoys high sales, the only justification for existence of the tail
is reduced costs of carrying these items (Anderson, 2004). This increase in variety
allows users with unusual tastes to easily access niche content in long tail markets.
Empirical evaluation of the phenomenon focused on validating the existence of long tail
phenomenon. Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) in an investigation of online and catalog sales
of women’s clothing found that online channels exhibited less concentration of sales in
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the top half of the market. Similar results have also been reported for information
goods in the context of movie rentals (Zentner et al., 2013). While long tail markets
allow niche products to survive in the tail, the niche products still constitute a much
smaller fraction of total sales (Brynjolfsson et al., 2011; Zentner et al., 2013). Given
the differences in network size and structure between the super stars in the head and
niche products in the tail, the question of network effects in long tail market merits
further inquiry.
Brand loyalty is another factor where contextual factors influence individuals’ pur-
chasing, yet IS literature is just beginning to investigate this fundamental relationship.
Its investigation is fundamental, as without the brand effects, what we observe through
network size as network externalities may be confounded by marketing and distribution
efforts. Brand loyalty manifests itself when consumers exhibit a bias towards one or
more alternative brands in their purchases (Jacoby and Kyner, 1973). IS research
on brand loyalty traditionally focused on the effect of information systems -such as
online forums or social media- on brand loyalty and not on effect of brand loyalty
on information goods purchases (Shang et al., 2006; Laroche et al., 2013). Switching
costs, that are familiar to IS researchers, have been identified as a mechanism used to
ensure loyalty, but loyalty is a broader concept (Yang and Peterson, 2004). Obviously,
the branding of an information good which provides an experience to the user, will be
different from more traditional goods such as tooth paste or cars. The consumption
of information goods are most often not repeat purchases of same product (Nelson,
1970), but purchase of an improved version down the line. Given the unique nature of
information goods, there are opportunities for theory contributions in IS discipline for
brand loyalty.
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3.3 Data and Methods
3.3.1 Data
The data used in this study comes from Steam, which according to forbes controls
70% of the market for downloadable pc games (Chiang, 2011), with over 125 Million
active users (Sherif, 2015). To collect this data we developed and deployed python
scripts to scrape public profile pages of 300 randomly selected users and their friends.
Figure 5 provides an example of said profile pages. The data we scraped from these
profile pages were entirely populated by the Steam and not the user. In selecting the
active users the criteria used was: (1) that they logged in to the steam in the last two
months, and (2) had at least one friend. This resulted in tracking a network of 8000
users with 1975 distinct games. We not only obtained data on the friendship network
but also the ownership of the games by these users. We used this data to obtain the
ownership information used as the dependent variable and the friendship information
used in social influence estimation. The average user owned about 39 games.
Figure 5. A steam profile page
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We obtained the market share of these games via a separate script. This script
randomly sampled 200,000 users and obtained a list of games they owned. Due to
private profiles and deactivated accounts, we were able to obtain data from around
165,000 users. In estimating the proportion of users in a given population, the
statistical power is calculated as n = ( z(α/2)
E
)2(p(1− p)). Where, E is the error margin,
z is the Z score for given alpha level, and finally p is the proportion of the real sample
(p=0.5 gives the most conservative estimate). The sample size chosen gives us sufficient
power to estimate each games’ market share with a margin of error less than 0.0031
at alpha level 0.01. We used data from this script to estimate the user base used as
proxy for network externality effects.
The final bit of information came from a third script used to crawl the Steam Store
pages of the 1975 games identified in the first step. Information on specific games
such as name, developer, features (multiplayer, single player, etc.) was obtained. We
used this information to generate variables for social features (multiplayer games) and
the brand variables.
Given the procedure above, you can see the list of variables used in this study
with their brief descriptions in Table 5
Variables Description
Ownedij Binary variable describing ownership of game j for user i.
FriendsOwnij Number of friends owning the same game j with the user i.
DevOwnij Number of games from the same developer as game j owned by user i minus 1.
Socialj Binary variable describing existence of multiplayer features in game j.
Basej Market share percentage of the game j, a proxy for network externalities.
Table 5. Variables used in the study.
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. As can
be seen, most games have less than 1 percent market share.
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Variable n Min q1 x˜ x¯ q3 Max s
Owned 588550 0 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 1.000 0.138
DevOwn 588550 0 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 26.000 0.652
FriendsOwn 588550 0 0.000 0.000 0.640 0.000 245.000 2.992
Base 1975 0 0.037 0.089 0.251 0.222 14.934 0.650
Social 1975 0 0.000 0.000 0.376 1.000 1.000 0.484
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Revealed Choice Data
3.3.2 Analysis Method
Considering the binary nature of our dependent variable (ownership) and repeated
observations of same individual, we used a conditional logit model. The conditional
logit model takes into account the common variance due to multiple observations of
the same user (McFadden, 1979). The conditional logit is a logit model where utility
of each purchase is specified as nij = zj′γ. zj represents a vector of characteristics of
the game j. Then the purchase propensity is given by the logit specification:
piij =
enij
1 + enij
(3.1)
3.4 Results
Due to network size and structure differences between products in the head and the
tail of the long tail market, there is reason to believe differences between head and tail
of the long tail market (Brynjolfsson et al., 2011). Hence I conducted a split sample
analysis for games at the head, games at the tail and games in between. Investigating
the distribution of user base figures, I split the sample by their user base numbers.
43
I categorized top 5% as the games in the head, 20% as the games in between, and
remaining 75% as the games in the tail.
Head Middle Tail
Free 0.058 (0.055) 0.059 (0.049) −0.129 (0.080)
FriendsOwn 0.021 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.081 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.143 (0.006)∗∗∗
Base 0.017 (0.026) 0.418 (0.106)∗∗∗ 5.943 (0.338)∗∗∗
Social −0.123 (0.072) −0.082 (0.076) 0.036 (0.067)
DevOwn 0.055 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.150 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.205 (0.005)∗∗∗
Base x Social 0.053 (0.026)∗ 0.001 (0.150) −1.299 (0.593)∗
FriendsOwn x Social −0.004 (0.002)∗ 0.002 (0.003) 0.005 (0.007)
AIC 25940.020 50976.990 55254.795
LR Test 962.2(7)p = 0 1380(7)p = 0 1865(7)p = 0
Num. events 3018 4402 3983
Num. obs. 26522 120988 443126
Missings 0 0 0
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 7. Results of estimation for split sample analysis
We see a trend in the effects of our variables of interest. The effects of all variables
of interest were lower for the products in the head, and increased in the tail. Each
unit change in number of friends owning the game created a 2% change in purchase
odds in the head, 8% in the middle, and 15% change in the tail of the market. The
results were even more dramatic for network externalities, while user base had no
main effect in the head, in the middle of the market each point increase in the user
base meant 40% increase in odds, and in the tail each point increase in user base lead
to over 300 times increase in odds. These results should be considered in the light of
the nature of user base. The user base variable ranges between 0 and 15, with the
mean at 0.089. A 1 point increase in user base basically makes any game a super star
(from 0 to head of the market). Hence the apparent extremity of these results are
normal. Table 7 reveals a similar pattern in brand loyalty as well. We can attribute
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the trend of increasing effects towards the tail to the demand for these games being
driven more by external factors such as advertising. Hence the purchasing propsensity
for the games in the head are not as heavily influenced by network externalities, social
influence, or brand loyalty as much as games in the tail end of the market. The games
in the tail on the other hand are heavily impacted by other channels such as word of
mouth between friends and brand loyalty of existing customers.
For games in the head, we notice that these games only benefit from network
externalities when the game had social features. Each point increase in user base
meant five percent increase in odds of purchase for multiplayer games in this group.
No such effect was observed for single player games in the head of the market. Yet
the effect of social features was reversed between the head and tail. Meaning there
may be a non-linear relation between social features and user base. If the network is
not large enough, as is the case in the tail, the social features actually hurt the game.
The reason for this reversal can be summed as: a multiplayer game without players is
not attractive.
The interaction between social influence and social features, while statistically
significant in the head of the market, was economically insignificant. The net effect
was 0.4% hence quite negligible.
3.5 Conclusions
This study complements our first study on user choice using a secondary dataset,
addressing generalizability and realism concerns of the experimental setup. We
investigated social influence and network externalities in purchase of information
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goods. Supporting and expanding upon our findings on externality enhancing features
in this first study.
We set out to answer two research questions: (1) understanding the effect of
network effects on purchasing behavior, and (2) uncovering the role of social features
in moderating network effects. Our findings reveal the network effects do drive
purchasing behavior and that the effect of network effects varied between market
segments. We found significant differences between the head and the tail of the long
tail market in terms of the effectiveness of network effects. The demand at the head
of the long tail market was not as influenced by our variables of interest as the tail
of the market. This finding suggests that the demand at the head of the market is
driven more by factors external to our study such as advertising. It is typical for
an AAA game (typical games in the head) to have astronomical advertising budgets.
GTA V had a total budget of $265 million, out of which $150 million was spent for
advertising (Fleming, 2013).
We found that social influence and network externalities was more effective towards
the tail of the market. Lacking the advertising budget of super stars and big name
developers, the niche players rely more on user base and social influence to generate
sales. These companies can increase their sales through methods that increase their
network such as giveaways, free sampling, discounts, and participating in bundles.
They can engage and mobilize their existing customers in forums and social media to
trigger word of mouth effects. Similarly, we found that brand loyalty was a significant
driver in the tail of the market. The smaller firms that operate in the tail of the
market, lacking the advertising capabilities, can utilize their reputation and direct
contacts with their customers to increase their sales.
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In answering our second research question regarding the role of social features, we
uncovered an interesting difference between the head and the tail of the market. At
the head of the market we found that social features enhanced the effects of network
externalities. Meaning when a large user base exists, the social features enhance these
effects. We observed opposite effects in the tail of the market. Suggesting if the user
base is small social features can have a detrimental role. The games that rely on
social features to engage users need a large enough user base to create engagement
(Refer to Chapter 4). In everyday terms, a multiplayer game without players is not
very desirable for customers. The literature argues intensity of network effects can
be enhanced through product features (Cheng et al., 2011). Our results reveal a
boundary condition in this relationship, if the network size is insufficient these features
can harm, rather than enhance utility.
The findings of this study contributes to the literature on social influence and
network externalities. We found significant differences in how these effects operated in
the head and tail of the long tail market. Our results reveal an important distinction
between the workings of the two effects, namely, network externalities can be enhanced
through social features. Yet the effect of social influence remains unchanged. Our
findings of brand loyalty in software markets, provide empirical evidence for a relation
long overlooked by IS research. Future research can expand upon this finding by
testing the boundary conditions for this relationship.
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Chapter 4
END-USER ENGAGEMENT IN THE FACE OF DIGITAL PLENTY
In this chapter we extend the work that is presented in Chapters 2 and 3 by
investigating post choice behavior. Changing business models in software industry are
resulting in the need for an emphasis on longer term relations and engagement with
users rather than closing one time sales (Niculescu and Wu, 2010; Ramaprasad and
Papna, 2015). Prominent gaming and productivity software vendors (e.g., Microsoft,
Adobe, Steam) have moved to licensing models selling functionality on an on-demand
basis (Papazoglou, 2003; Ramaprasad and Papna, 2015). Most recently Amazon
shifted to a system where the developers are paid based on per minute usage of their
Apps (called Amazon Underground, Amazon Inc., 2015). This shift in business models
requires vendors to attract and capture users’ continued interest, and to engage users
to spend time in their system (O’Brien and Toms, 2008). In hedonic contexts such
as gaming, the implications are even more salient as multiple products compete for
users’ scarce attention. In this study we investigate user engagement with the software
post-purchase and assess how developers’ fundamental design choices and add-on
strategy influence user engagement.
The key to continued engagement is persuasive design (Fogg, 2009). The initial
design decisions such as social interactions and novelty differentiate the products in
hyper competitive software markets, defining the game’s performance going forward
(Eisenman, 2013). The games are engaging to players as long as they satisfy the
needs for competence through novel challenges, or through satisfying the need for
relatedness through player-to-player interactions (Weibel et al., 2008; Yee, 2006; Ryan
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and Deci, 2000; Ryan et al., 2006). More recently, the software distribution platforms
are creating opportunities to enhance game design after its initial release through
distribution of add-on content in the form of community produced user generated
content (UGC)6 and developer produced downloadable content (DGC)7. DGC can
be seen as implementation of traditional add-on product strategy in software context
(Erat and Bhaskaran, 2012). Add-on products came into being as a tool of price
discrimination, yet the unique nature of software product allowed it to evolve in ways
different than those observed in traditional markets. The nature of software production
and distribution gave rise to a significant body of add-on products developed by user
community, leading to UGC (Goldfarb, 2013). While both DGC and UGC has
established themselves in the software markets, the IS research on the phenomena is
just emerging.
Valve software’s Team Fortress 2 (TF2) is a prime example that keeps users
engaged through game design and add-on strategy. Valve software paid $57 Million to
the community modders who developed user generated add-on content for its games
since 2011 (O’Connor, 2015). Through a series of carefully timed DGC and UGC
releases, TF2 has managed to remain competitive over the years. In 2014, TF2 was
the second most popular game on the Steam platform, seven years after its initial
release 8 (Orland, 2014).
6For example, ‘Dust 2 Night’ a version of famous Counter Strike map Dust that takes place at
night, is available for download on Steam Workshop for free.
7For example, the ‘Burial at Sea’ DGC adds a whole new single player scenario to the famous
Bioshock Infinite on sale in Steam for $14.99.
8Steam is the largest gaming software distribution platform in the world
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As contingency theory posits, firms need to adjust their strategies to the realities
of their context (Donaldson, 2001). Gaming industry is no different, in the sense
that developers position their games in certain segments of the markets (social games,
single player games, indie games, etc.) through fundamental design decisions such as
social features, novelty, and visual style. These segment choices –and design decisions
leading up to them– should dictate subsequent design and add-on content decisions.
Properly aligning these design decisions can increase fit between the context and
firm’s strategy, leading to increased engagement. A misalignment however can reduce
the users’ engagement (Sutcliffe, 2009; Webster and Ahuja, 2006) and thus harm the
firm’s bottomline. Design theories for achieving the ‘coherent experience’, or alignment
of features has been proposed (Dickey, 2005), yet the empirical studies so far have
investigated the direct effect of following these heuristics (Webster and Ahuja, 2006),
and not the synergies that can be achieved through alignment of features.
With the tremendous development of platform economies and social networks,
it has become extremely important to understand, what aspects of design impact
engagement. Motivated by the above mentioned design challenges in the social and
platform economies, in this study, we seek to investigate how design would impact user
engagement in the context of gaming software, and to uncover strategies in aligning
the design features to increase engagement.
It has been demonstrated that engaged users use the systems more (Webster and
Ahuja, 2006; O’Brien and Toms, 2008), and spend more money on premium content
(Oestreicher-Singer and Zalmanson, 2013). Game industry is a prime context to study
engagement, as the survival of games heavily depend on users’ engagement with the
game (Chen, 2007). In this platform economy, designing games to leverage network
effects through social features are theoretically shown to be beneficial to network
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organizations (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Eisenmann et al., 2006). The industry
practitioners have been employing numerous practices to enhance user engagement by
leveraging network effects. For example, firms create user and developer communities,
or carry price promotions to increase user bases. As the platform markets open doors
for third party innovation, companies have been leveraging developer communities to
outsource their game designs, through add-ons. In order to assess the business value of
such design approaches, it is essential to establish the effects of user base, game design,
user and developer generated content on users’ engagement. However, the market level
evidence for the effect of these fundamental design choices is a nascent area that IS and
HCI researchers are just beginning to investigate. Our understanding of market level
effects of fundamental design decisions –such as whether to integrate social features,
or to integrate designs of community developers– is lacking. Furthermore, we have
little empirical evidence on possible complementarities between these design decisions.
Therefore, this chapter seeks to address the following research questions:
How do fundamental design features such as (1) social feature, (2) game design
novelty and (3) UGC and DGC jointly affect user engagement? Specifically, we
explore the alignment between social features and add-on content type (UGC versus
DGC) and the alignment between social features and novel game designs by exploring
the complementarity between the game design features.
To answer these research questions, we obtain a data set from Steam, the leading
game distribution platform in the world with over 70% market share (Chiang, 2011)
and over 125 Million active users (Sherif, 2015). Our dataset includes over 6,000
games in a 104 day period between late 2014 and early 2015. We use mixed effects
models to investigate effects of game and platform design features on user engagement.
Our results indicate that games with features to utilize social interactions benefit
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from large user bases. Such games also benefited to a greater extent from the user
generated content. The effect of DGC is more salient for games without social features
(single-player games). Finally we found that games that have novel design features
were more engaging, especially more so if they did not rely on social interactions.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, we
survey the extant literature on user engagement and IT artifact design, and propose
theoretically grounded hypotheses. Then we describe our data, the empirical models
and report the results of statistical analysis. We conclude the chapter with a discussion
of key findings and implications.
4.1 Literature Review
Information Systems literature has primarily focused on the antecedents to system
adoption (Robey, 1979; Venkatesh and Davis, 2000) and system usage (Burton-Jones
and Straub, 2006; Venkatesh et al., 2012). As IT becomes consumerized (Harris et al.,
2012), we expect to see that the developers shift their focus to reflect interdependencies
between artifact design and consumer desires in the information-intensive competitive
markets (Johns, 2006; Rai and Tang, 2013). Product performance in such competitive
markets depends on the alignment of firm decisions to the context (Venkatraman,
1989). In 2016, 90% of all apps on google play store was free (AppBrain, 2016), relying
completely on sales of adds and add-on content for revenue. Amazon recently started a
program wherein developers are paid by the minute for the use of their apps (Amazon
Inc., 2015). Clearly retaining consumers is becoming even more of an existential
question as the markets are being dominated by alternative business models that rely
on continued engagement. Software design plays an active role in reducing consumers’
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uncertainty about product quality (Dimoka et al., 2012), fit (Hong and Pavlou, 2014),
and shaping choice (Eisenman, 2013) and satisfaction (Sutanto et al., 2011; Gu and
Ye, 2014; Liu et al., 2014).
User engagement in the design of IT artifacts carries two distinct meanings: (1)
The involvement of the users in the design process (Hwang and Thorn, 1999; Salvo,
2001) , and (2) users’ experience while using the system (Dickey, 2005; Sutcliffe, 2009).
We focus on the second meaning, user engagement as the ability of the IT artifact to
attract and retain user attention (O’Brien and Toms, 2008). We define Engagement
as the increased and repeated use of the system. It has been shown that higher
engagement increases willingness to pay for premium services (Oestreicher-Singer
and Zalmanson, 2013) and community engagement has been shown to increase both
utilitarian and hedonistic benefits of the systems (Grange and Benbasat, 2014).
The literature on engaging users by design strives to develop methods and heuristics
to create user interfaces that are not only usable, but also exciting, fun and aesthetically
pleasing (Dickey, 2005; O’Brien and Toms, 2008; Pinelle et al., 2008; Sutcliffe, 2009).
Based on a multitude of behavioral theories such as flow, play, and self determination,
researchers have proposed heuristics and design principles that would drive engagement.
These studies offer guidelines which, when implemented, will lead to a coherent
experience. The coherent experience is a result of correctly aligning software features.
Various streams of research such as education (Dickey, 2005), e-commerce (Jiang
and Benbasat, 2007; Grange and Benbasat, 2014) and games industry (Chen, 2007)
have contributed to this line of research providing empirical evaluations. Webster
and Ahuja (2006), for instance, experimentally tested design principles as they relate
to user disorientation and conclude disorientation takes away from user engagement.
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Alignment of design features has been an implicit assumption of design theories and
has been mostly overlooked in the empirical evaluations.
The most relevant application of this line of inquiry into gaming focused mainly
on user experience dimensions such as, flow (Qiu and Benbasat, 2005; Chen, 2007;
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), goal setting (Erez and Zidon, 1984; Locke and Latham,
1990), and behavior (Sutanto et al., 2011); However, key aspects of design such as
social interactivity or the platforms’ role in enabling engagement through content
creation and consumption have not yet been explored in this literature (Barki and
Hartwick, 1994; Oestreicher-Singer and Zalmanson, 2013). With a focus more on
the design process and its evaluation, the research literature has mainly relied on
experiments in artificial settings. Whereas, another key dimension of design is the
product’s performance in the marketplace (Fogg, 2009). User engagement, measured
at the market level is the most significant indicator of design impact. As we gain
more transparency on user behavior in marketplace, the relation between fundamental
design decisions and market level response can be more critically examined. In this
study we aim to provide a test of fundamental design decisions by developers on the
eventual engagement of the user base, with a focus on alignment of design decisions.
4.2 Hypotheses
O’Brien and Toms (2008) presents a comprehensive summary of theories surround-
ing user engagement; bringing together flow, play, information interaction and self
determination theories to build a narrative around user engagement. Here we shape
our hypotheses around the core theories used in O’Brien and Toms (2008). Their
findings indicate that user engagement leads to increased and repeated use of the
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system (Webster and Ahuja, 2006; O’Brien and Toms, 2008). Hence we utilize usage
as a measure of engagement. Traditionally usage has been analyzed at the individual
level, in our study we aggregate users engagement with software to arrive at a product
level measure of engagement. This allows us to study the effect of design features at
market-product level.
We expect there to be synergies between design decisions regarding social features
(e.g. collaborative editing, multiplayer) and add-on strategy decisions. The strategic
alignment between them is such that: we expect social games to enhance the effect of
add-on content. There would be further synergies between design decisions and novel
designs. Social features by allow users to learn from others, reducing the difficulty of
learning the novel features will benefit more from novel designs. We will be presenting
our hypotheses in two groups: we will be presenting the hypotheses about the direct
effects of various design decisions together as main effects, the hypotheses relating to
the strategic alignment as the alignment effects. Please refer to Figure 6 for research
framework.
Figure 6. Research Framework
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4.2.1 Main Effects
Ultimate purpose of any software is to facilitate users’ access to content (Toms,
2002). This content is what satisfies users’ need for autonomy, competence, and
relatedness, thus triving engagement (Ryan et al., 2006; Yee, 2006). For hedonic
information goods - like books, movies and computer games - the users consume the
content offered by the product and move on to others (Nelson, 1970). Traditionally,
the content the game shipped with was what drove engagement. Recent shifts in
platform markets made add-on content in the form of UGC and DGC widely available
to the gaming market. These add-ons introduce new content into the product (Erat
and Bhaskaran, 2012). We hypothesize that the added content will increase the
engagement of the users. We believe both types of add-on content will enhance
engagement, due to increased amount of content.
Hypothesis 1. Developer generated content will increase engagement.
Hypothesis 2. User generated content will increase engagement.
Differentiation through innovative product design is a tool available to developers
in their competition with others (Porter, 2008). Hence developers try to develop novel
content. In the consumer side, novelty and variety has been identified as a driver of
user engagement (O’Brien and Toms, 2008, 2010). From a self determination angle,
users will seek out novelty in order to satisfy their intrinsic need for competence as
familiar content will not provide adequate level of challenge after a while (Ryan and
Deci, 2000). From a stimulus seeking theory angle, novel content is more engaging
to users as it preserves arousal (Webster and Ho, 1997). It has been found that the
innovative software often benefits from its novelty, even when the innovation gets
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copied and becomes widely available (Li et al., 2014). In light of the previous literature
we expect that the products with novel design features will be more engaging.
Hypothesis 3. Novel designs will increase engagement.
4.2.2 Alignment Effects
Market performance relies on the fit between context and strategic decisions (Venka-
traman, 1989; Donaldson, 2001). In order to engineer engagement, the developers
need to strategically align the features they design in their games. Certain features
combined together may increase the engagement of the games further than other
combinations.
While novel content increases the engagement level of products (as discussed
above), they also carry the risk of increasing the cognitive cost for the users (O’Brien
and Toms, 2008; Attfield et al., 2011). A game that is too innovative will be unfamiliar,
and hard to adjust to for the users. The social games, however, allow users to learn
from each other (McFadden and Train, 1996). Learning from others, will provide
users with an alternative channel. Hence search costs associated with learning the new
features will be lowered (Bakos, 1998). Hence social games will enhance the effects of
novelty, by reducing effort of finding out about the content.
Hypothesis 4. Social features will increase the effects of novel design on engagement
(compared to single player games).
The second way a game keeps users engaged is the player to player interactions.
The effect of player to player interactions is two folds, first it satisfies the users’ need
for relatedness Ryan et al. (2006); Ryan and Deci (2000). Second, unlike scripted
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interactions the single player component provides, player to player interaction can
evolve in unscripted, dynamic ways hence provide a different experience each time a
game is played Alemi (2007); Liu et al. (2013), satisfying the users’ social and novelty
seeking needs O’Brien and Toms (2008); Weibel et al. (2008); Ryan and Deci (2000).
We posit that the dynamic nature of player to player interactions serve as a multiplier
for a content’s engagement. The dynamic nature of player to player interaction will
keep the content that facilitates such engagement engaging for a longer time compared
to scripted interactions a single player experience provides. In the context of add-on
products this means social features that enable multiplayer interactions will enhance
the effect of add-on content.
Hypothesis 5. Social features will increase the effects of developer generated content
on user engagement more compared to single player features.
Hypothesis 6. Social features will increase the effects of user generated content on
user engagement more compared to single player features.
4.3 Empirical Methods
4.3.1 Data and Variables
Our data comes from Steam, the largest online software distribution platform
with over 125 Million active users (Sherif, 2015) and over 70% market share for
downloadable games (Chiang, 2011). We wrote python scripts to collect publicly
available data from Steam API, product pages and user profiles. The scripts were
deployed on an Amazon AWS EC2 server and ran daily. The weekly aggregated data
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covers a 61 week period between Jan, 1, 2015 to Feb, 25, 2016. The dataset tracks
7323 products and has 398201 observations. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics.
mean sd AvgMin Users Percent multi New Price Discount free Bundled Uniq UGC
AvgMin 235.03 723.94
Users 421.00 12820.63 0.34***
Percent 0.00 0.00 0.36*** 0.61***
Social 0.36 0.48 0.08*** 0.03*** 0.09***
New 0.03 0.17 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.03*** -0.01***
Price 11.87 13.51 0.20*** 0.00* 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Discount 0.06 0.15 -0.01*** -0.01** 0.01*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01***
free 0.04 0.19 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.06*** -0.17*** -0.07***
Bundled 0.35 0.48 -0.04*** 0.01*** 0.07*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.11*** -0.14***
Uniq 0.01 0.01 0.14*** 0.01*** 0.08*** -0.09*** 0.01*** 0.20*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.05***
UGC 194.15 8664.42 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.00
DGC 0.24 0.72 0.24*** 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.10*** 0.01*** 0.17*** 0.02*** 0.18*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.00**
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of Engagement Data
To derive our Engagement and Percent metrics, we randomly sampled around
185.000 users every day and recorded their ownership and play times up to the point
of observation. We carried out power calculations and determined a sample size that
limited the margin of error to .002 at .05 α level.
Engagement : We used average minutes played as a measure of engagement. The
variable was highly skewed, in the models discussed below we used log transformed
average minutes played as the dependent variable. As an alternative we also utilized
mean of number of players observed through out the week.
Percent : Percent is the percentage of users in the sample that owned a given game.
It is a measure of user base. Since this is a long tail market, most games have less
than 1 percent market share.
Social : An indicator variable for multi player features in the game. If the game
has social features this variable is set to 1, 0 otherwise.
New : An indicator variable for games in their first two months of observation.
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ListPrice: Daily recommended sale price for the game. Newer games and games
with more content usually sell for higher prices.
Discount : Daily discount ratio, calculated over the list price. We used one lag to
integrate previous days’ observation.
Bundled : If a game has been part of a bundle of deeply discounted games before.
Set to 1 after bundling period, 0 otherwise.
User Generated Content (UGC): Number of user generated additional content
items for the game. We used one lag to integrate previous days’ observation.
Developer Generated Content (DGC): Number of developer generated content for
the game. We used one lag to integrate previous days’ observation.
Novelty : Each game is tagged by the users based on their features (i.e: action,
great soundtrack, atmospheric, etc.). To construct a meaningful measure of game
novelty, we collected up to 20 most popular user generated tags for each game. We
weighted each tag inversely proportional to the frequency they appeared across the
games and adjusted for the total number of tags a game received. The higher scores
on this variable mean that the game has more novel features. See Equation 4.1 to see
how we calculated this variable. T is the tag (i) - game (j) matrix, the v is the tag
weights vector, s is the novelty score vector for games. For example let us say a game
has two tags, Action and Poetry. Action is very common, appearing in 250 games,
and Poetry is a rare tag, appearing in two games. The novelty score for this game
would be calculated as follows: s = 1/250+1/2
2
= 0.252
T(i× j), v = 1
1′T
and s =
Tv′
T1
(4.1)
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4.3.2 Estimation Model
Our variables of interest were both time variant and time invariant. In order to
estimate a model that allows for both variable types and control for heterogeneity at
the same time, we decided to fit a mixed effects model. Hedonistic software goods are
designed to cater to a variety of user tastes. That is, we expect heterogeneity at game
level. The UGC and DGC created for these games will also reflect this heterogeneity.
Hence, we integrated random coefficients for game and effect of UGC and UGC in
games.
We used a mixed effects model with both random and fixed effects. Equation 4.2
shows the mixed effects model formula. Where Yi is the vector of engagement variables
for game i, Xi is the matrix of predictor variables of game i and β is the fixed effects
vector. bi is the random effects vector for game i and Zi the random effects design
matrix for the same.
Yi = Xiβ + Zibi + εi (4.2)
In our specific example, the Zi design matrix is created with game id and UGC,
DGC in games. This means, each game has a different intercept and a different slope
on the UGC and DGC variables. All independent variables are included in Xi.
4.4 Results
We integrated game, UGC and DGC within game random effects and ran an F test.
The F test results indicated that random effects improve model fit. We also controlled
for effects of time through weekly dummy variables. This is especially important as
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 1.9171 (0.2086)∗∗∗ 1.8890 (0.2076)∗∗∗ 2.0046 (0.2080)∗∗∗
Weekly Dummies Y ES Y ES Y ES
New −0.2283 (0.0055)∗∗∗ −0.2244 (0.0055)∗∗∗ −0.2242 (0.0055)∗∗∗
log(ListPricet−1) 0.0002 (0.0081) 0.0043 (0.0082) 0.0042 (0.0082)
free 1.8375 (0.1445)∗∗∗ 0.9243 (0.1099)∗∗∗ 0.8407 (0.1085)∗∗∗
Discountt−1 −0.0304 (0.0068)∗∗∗ −0.0223 (0.0068)∗∗ −0.0223 (0.0068)∗∗
Bundled −0.0895 (0.0055)∗∗∗ −0.0852 (0.0055)∗∗∗ −0.0851 (0.0055)∗∗∗
log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.2892 (0.0124)
∗∗∗ 0.2389 (0.0169)∗∗∗
log(DGCt−1 + 1) 2.0027 (0.0465)
∗∗∗ 1.7232 (0.0600)∗∗∗
Uniq 0.5313 (0.2794) −0.2545 (0.3029)
log(Percentt−1 + 1) −36.0983 (0.8634)∗∗∗ −38.7283 (1.8380)∗∗∗
Social −0.3045 (0.0533)∗∗∗ −0.6211 (0.0642)∗∗∗
Social ×log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.1191 (0.0237)∗∗∗
Social ×log(DGCt−1 + 1) 0.6442 (0.0911)∗∗∗
Social × Uniq 5.0220 (0.7590)∗∗∗
Social ×log(Percentt−1 + 1) 3.4111 (2.0797)
Variance: AppID 6.0002 6.0608 6.0322
Variance: AppID log(UGC+1) 0.0428 0.0624 0.0656
Variance: AppID log(DGC+1) 0.9180 3.9822 0.9489
Variance: Residual 0.2076 0.2039 0.2039
AIC 534574.0258 519821.3833 519714.7665
BIC 535365.9762 520666.4607 520603.1812
Log Likelihood −267214.0129 −259832.6916 −259775.3832
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 9. Results of Mixed Effects Models for Usage
our dataset covers important seasonal events like Christmas and New Year holidays;
combined with deep discounts, gaming activity increases in these periods. Table 9
shows the REML estimates for the model. Dependent variable is log of average minutes
used, this is a cumulative measure as we observe the average minutes the game was
played from the beginning to the end. We started with a baseline model with just
the control variables, then integrated main effects and interactions respectively. Each
model represents a significant improvement over the previous model according to F
tests on ML estimates. Results are qualitatively consistent across models, thus we
will present results from Model 3.
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All hypothesized main effects were supported in the empirical model. The main
effect of DGC is significant and positive, which supports our first hypothesis (1). A one
percent increase in user generated content will lead to 0.7% increase in engagement;
lending support to Hypothesis 2 . While the main effect of novel content on average
minutes used was not significant, this relation was fully mediated by social features.
The results supported our alignment hypotheses as well. The effect of novel content
was more pronounced in games with social features as hypothesized in 4. As stated in
Hypotheses 5 and 6, there were complementarities between social features and type
of add-on content suitable for the game. We found that social features enhanced the
effects of add-on content.
Control variables tell a plausible story as well. New games were played less in
their first four months. Users playing the more expensive games were more engaged.
Free games are more engaging in line with Fogg’s predictions on financial ability being
a factor of simplicity (Fogg, 2009). Interestingly, we observe that games with large
userbases were less engaging, the games that have larger user bases are used less. This
is an unexpected result as one would expect the user base to increase the engagement
overall through network effects. We believe this negative effect is due to promotions
and impulse buying. It has been observed that 26% of the games purchased on
Steam have not been played at all (Orland, 2014). Steam is well known for deals
and promotions, we believe this may be triggering impulse buying of games that the
players never play. This idea is partially supported by the result that discounts reduce
engagement. When a game is discounted, a lot of new players will enter the user base
with low average usage durations. Hence it is normal to observe this effect. Still, we
found that for the games with social features this negative effect was less pronounced
which makes sense.
63
While average minutes used is a reasonable measure of engagement, we decided to
verify these findings with an alternative measure of engagement. For this purpose, we
utilized the average number of users per week. There are two significant differences
between the two measures of engagement. First, while average minutes used is a
cumulative measure based on all players, the number of users is based on daily
observations. Second, the average minutes used is an attribute of users owning the
base product, whereas user number is dependent on the sheer number of users owning
the base product. A game with a user base of 10 people can be just as engaging as a
game with 10 million users in terms of usage, yet the user numbers won’t reflect this.
Hence some difference in results are to be expected as discussed below. The results
can be seen in Table 10. The dependent variable is log of average number of users per
week.
As noted earlier, there are some significant differences in control variables due to
the dependent variables being cumulative or one time observations. Any change that
brings new users to the game drives down the average minutes played as the new users
will have not yet used the game. So we observe that new games have more players but
the effect of newness is a reduction in the number of minutes played. Same argument
applies for the differences in discounts and bundling, both of which are events that
introduce lots of new players with little time spent in the game. List price story also
makes sense from this cross examination stand point. A more expensive game is more
engaging in the sense that it is played for a longer time on average as it contains more
content, yet fewer people can afford it so the player numbers are lower.
Having noted the differences in control variables, we see that the hypothesized
relations hold for user numbers as they did for usage. A percentage point increase in
DGC increases the player numbers by .87%, supporting Hypothesis 1, whereas a one
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 2.5089 (0.0343)∗∗∗ 2.2768 (0.0383)∗∗∗ 2.3075 (0.0388)∗∗∗
Weekly Dummies Y ES Y ES Y ES
New 0.5640 (0.0044)∗∗∗ 0.5667 (0.0044)∗∗∗ 0.5671 (0.0044)∗∗∗
log(ListPricet−1 + 1) −0.1889 (0.0071)∗∗∗ −0.1878 (0.0071)∗∗∗ −0.1877 (0.0071)∗∗∗
free 2.0937 (0.1169)∗∗∗ 1.7552 (0.1123)∗∗∗ 1.7249 (0.1117)∗∗∗
Discountt−1 0.9216 (0.0053)
∗∗∗ 0.9211 (0.0054)∗∗∗ 0.9204 (0.0054)∗∗∗
Bundled 0.2523 (0.0046)∗∗∗ 0.2515 (0.0047)∗∗∗ 0.2502 (0.0047)∗∗∗
log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.2224 (0.0229)
∗∗∗ 0.1638 (0.0322)∗∗∗
log(DGCt−1 + 1) 0.8734 (0.0551)
∗∗∗ 0.6337 (0.0719)∗∗∗
Uniq 1.0587 (0.2263)∗∗∗ 0.7082 (0.2441)∗∗
log(Percentt−1 + 1) 26.1444 (0.6932)
∗∗∗ 47.9216 (1.5477)∗∗∗
Social 0.4185 (0.0540)∗∗∗ 0.3128 (0.0572)∗∗∗
Social ×log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.1164 (0.0449)∗∗
Social ×log(DGCt−1 + 1) 0.5538 (0.1089)∗∗∗
Social × Uniq 2.4862 (0.6268)∗∗∗
Social ×log(Percentt−1 + 1) −27.1866 (1.7287)∗∗∗
Num. groups: AppID 5766 5736 5736
Variance: AppID. 3.7611 3.6407 3.6151
Variance: AppID log(UGC+1) 0.1669 0.1432 0.1381
Variance: AppID log(DGC+1) 2.0802 2.4529 2.3882
Variance: Residual 0.1044 0.1045 0.1044
AIC 207584.7290 205578.9450 205292.7344
BIC 208333.1886 206379.3727 206135.2898
Log Likelihood −103721.3645 −102713.4725 −102566.3672
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 10. Results of Mixed Effects Models for Users
percent increase in UGC increases the player numbers by .22% lending support to
Hypothesis 2. Seemingly small these effects are quite significant considering the large
user base of Steam. According to latest data Steam has over 125 Million active users.
For a game with 1% market penetration (1,250,000 users) a one percent increase in
DGC means an additional 10875 users, and 2750 additional users for a one percent
increase in UGC. The main effect of novelty was significant and positive in all models.
Unlike usage, novel content had a direct effect not mediated by social features in user
numbers. The novel games were more likely to attract users, supporting Hypothesis 3.
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This effect was even more pronounced in games with social features as the interaction
of Social and Uniq is significant and positive, lending support to Hypothesis 4.
Our results reveal social features enhance the effects of add-on content in user
numbers as they did for usage. The effect of one percent increase in UGC for single
player games was a .16% increase in user numbers (2,000 additional users), the same
was .27% (3,375) for games with social features (Hypothesis 6). Similarly, DGC had
an effect of .63% on usage numbers for single player games (7,875). The same effect
was 1.18% (14,750) for games with social features (Hypothesis 5). Using two different
measures of engagement, we arrive at similar results. Lending further support to our
argument.
The gaming market is a long tail market, with few products taking up the lions
share and others competing for scraps. In such an environment the concern that the
results may not be valid for a great many games is a valid one. To address this concern
we conducted the same analysis reported here after removing the most popular games
from our sample. As can be seen in Appendix B.1, the results remained unchanged for
engagement measured by average minutes used. There were some differences in user
numbers models when most popular games were removed from the sample. It would
seem, the social features are more influential in driving the engagement as measured
by user numbers for popular games through novelty. Less well known games, while
enjoying the same effects on minutes used, do not benefit from the multiplier effect of
social features in user numbers. This is reasonable, as smaller user bases reduce the
effectiveness of possible network effects these games may enjoy in reaching outside
the network of existing users. So, while the social features drive the time spent in
the game, within the network of the existing users, due to novelty and user generated
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content, they do not increase the number of players by reaching the users not yet
owning the base product.
4.5 Discussion
In this study, we investigated the effect of alignments between software features on
user engagement with data from a major software distribution platform with over 125
Million active users. Our study provides empirical evidence from software markets
on this issue. Beyond addressing this gap in the literature, our study also presents
a novel data source and a unique measure of novelty of software products. Table 11
presents a summary of our key findings. Our results indicate that it is possible to
strategically align disparate design features to achieve increased user engagement.
We found strong complementarities between social structure of the game and type
of add-ons. We found that social games benefited more from user generated content,
while single player games benefited more from developer generated content. Likewise,
we found that the driver of engagement differed based on social structure. Social
games relied more heavily on size of the user base, whereas single player games relied
more on novel designs. The practical implications of our research for developers is
immediately apparent. Developers should adopt the add-on and design strategy that
aligns with their social design.
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. While extant literature focuses
on heuristics and design parameters at micro level, we look at the broader picture of
higher level design decisions such as social features, novel designs and type of add-on
content, with a focus on alignment of these decisions. Where literature has focused
on self reports and laboratory settings, our study presents evidence from the field
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with a unique dataset derived from the largest distribution platform for games. Our
study presents the first market level evidence of effects of add-on strategy on user
engagement. Finally we developed and presented a new way of measuring novelty
based on user generated tags.
In this study we don’t measure the UGC and DGC distinctions. Since games are
hedonistic goods, there is bound to be great heterogeneity in the structure of DGC
and UGC created for different games. That is, not all UGC and DGC are created
equal. We control for this through random coefficients. Still, some characterization or
clustering of UGC and DGC can further provide insights on exactly how alignment
can happen in terms of social features. We believe future research can focus on
distinguishing characteristics of add-on content to arrive at a more detailed picture of
the phenomenon.
The results presented here are from market level data on games. A cross examina-
tion with user level data to further reaffirm these results would be beneficial. Using
user level data would have the further advantage of enabling the investigation of social
influence and network externalities beyond what is presented here. This study leaves
out the investigation of possible complementarities between add-on content strategies
as this is beyond the scope of current study. Further investigation into complemen-
tarities or substitutive relations between these strategies would be of interest to the
practitioners.
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Hypothesis Description Status
H1 Developer generated content will create engagement SUPPORTED
H2 User generated content will create engagement SUPPORTED
H3 Novelty will increase engagement SUPPORTED
H4 Novelty will increase engagement more for single player SUPPORTED
H5 Developer generated content will increase single player games’ engagement more SUPPORTED
H6 User generated content will increase social games’ engagement more SUPPORTED
Table 11. Status of Hypotheses for User Engagement Study
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation presents three distinct studies into end-user behavior in software
markets: (1) a stated preference study on consumer choice, (2) a revealed preference
study on purchasing behavior, and (3) an inquiry into post choice engagement with
software. In this dissertation we aimed to investigate end-user behavior in software
markets. The findings broadly implicate that, the business strategy should align
with (1) software design and (2) market context. These findings necessitate careful
consideration on the part of software developers before commiting to any strategy.
5.1 Findings
Our stated preference study presented in Chapter 2 revealed differences on the
effect of zero price strategies on utilitarian and non-utilitarian features. We found
that while the effect of adding utilitarian features on choice was enhanced by zero
price, the same complementary effect was not observed for non-utilitarian features.
Our results revealed that consumer characteristics moderated the role of zero price
strategy on user choice as well. We found users that associated price with quality
shied away from free products. The market price structure also had an effect on zero
price strategies as users preferred free products more in high price conditions.
The experimental approach taken in Chapter 2, had some limitations when it
comes to investigating (1) network effects and (2) branding, both of which are
important dimensions of software product. We conducted a second study with a
70
different methodological approach -revealed preferences- to address these issues, which
is presented in Chapter 3. Using Python scripts deployed on Amazon Web Services
Cloud (AWS), we gathered data for 8000 users on 2500 games from a leading online
gaming platform. The results revealed that social features only enhanced network
externalities and not social influence. We also found evidence of brand loyalty in
software context a dimension of consumer choice that received relatively little attention
from IS community.
Business models employed in software markets today rely on continued relations
between the user and the product. Hence, the choice is only part of the question. To
understand how consumer engagement post choice can be bolstered we conducted the
study presented in Chapter 4. The focus was on strategies to extend engagement with
the software, hence we looked at the effect of software design on add-on content’s effect
on usage. We collected data from an online gaming platform. The scripts deployed in
AWS collected daily data for over a year for 7000 games. Our results revealed that
social features enhanced the effects of add-on content. The add-on content was found
to be more effective in multiplayer games, in comparison to single player games. Our
results also revealed complementarities between social features and innovative design.
Finally, we found more innovative content to be more engaging in multiplayer settings.
5.2 Implications to Theory and Practice
In the course of this research we extended the Social Judgment Theory into the
IS context through investigation of software constructs (Sherif and Hovland, 1961).
The theory has seen some interest in the Business School disciplines, but most of
this interest was focused on assimilation and contrast mechanisms (Cummings and
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Ostrom, 1982; Huang and Washington, 2015; Meyers-Levy and Sternhal, 1993). By
utilizing the oft overlooked mechanisms of anchoring and ego involvement, we were
able to utilize this theory to comprehensively answer the choice question from three
dimensions: (1) product features, (2) consumer characteristics, and (3) context. The
result of this effort was the investigation of hypothesis, constructs, and relations not
yet considered in the literature. Our other key contribution was through investigation
of a key software design feature: social feature. Through our investigation, we were
able to more clearly identify the role of social features in (1) facilitating network effects,
and (2) moderating the role of add-on features. Thus, furthering the understanding of
the concept in IS literature.
Beyond the contributions to the literature, the research presented in this disserta-
tion is highly relevant to the practitioners. In all studies, software design and business
strategies play a prominent role. The research can inform the best product design
to go with common strategies such as free-to-play, user generated content, developer
generated content and so on.
The results from Chapter 2 can inform developers considering a freemium strategy.
Our results reveal asymmetric effects of utilitarian product features in zero price
settings. The developers should carefully consider the feature sets offered in free and
paid versions of their products. We found that such complementarities were absent in
case of non-utilitarian features such as licensing terms. These features can be more
easily moved between paid and free versions as the developers need not be concerned
beyond the direct effect of such a move. Our results as they relate to consumer
characteristics reveal that it is possible to build versioning strategy based on consumer
characteristics. In devising feature sets for product versions, the developers can use
target market characteristics to inform their decisions. Finally, our results as to the
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context effects indicate consumers’ perceptions can be shifted through communication.
It is possible to alter the attractiveness of a product feature through advertising.
Hence developers are not only limited to feature sets and pricing strategies in their
market activities. They can use information campaigns to alter consumer perceptions.
The results from Chapter 3 focus on interaction of software features and network
effects. Our finding can aid developers focus their efforts to increase user base. We
found that for popular games games with multiplayer features benefit more from
a larger user base. This means, the sampling strategies will be more effective for
multiplayer games at the head of the market. In the tail of the market, multiplayer
features actually dampened the effect of user base. Meaning before reaching a sizable
user size multiplayer features may act as a curse. Similar effects however were not
observed for social influence. Developers can always benefit from social influence
whether their game has social features or not. The branding does play a significant
role in the software market. Hence developers should focus on their reputation in the
market. The brand loyalty, social influence, and network externality effects were more
pronounced in the tail of the market.
Our results on add-on strategy from Chapter 4 can inform developers on ways
to extend the profitable period of their products’ life cycle. We found that both
user generated (UGC) and developer generated (DGC) add-on content extended the
product’s engagement. The effect of each unit of of DGC was greater, yet as Valve
CEO Gabe Newell puts it, the users are generating high quality content at higher
volumes than developers can afford. So while each unit of UGC is less effective,
the sheer number of UGC available still makes their effect formidable. We found
both DGC and UGC was more effective in multiplayer context. Hence developers of
multiplayer products stand to gain more from add-on content. The findings of this
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third study also inform innovative designs. Too much innovation can hamper adaption
due to increased learning costs. The social features help alleviate this problem through
presenting an additional channel of learning of new features. Hence developers of
innovative products will be better served if they integrate social features into their
products.
5.3 Future Research
The research presented in this dissertation is a first look into an emerging phe-
nomenon. Our inquiry raises questions for future research to address. In this section
we will discuss some of the more promising ones. Our finding of differential effects
between utilitarian and non-utilitarian features in zero price context from Chapter 2
merits further inquiry. We found that licensing features that do not directly con-
tribute to product’s utility did not have the same complementary relationship the
more utilitarian features had. An inquiry into other types of non-utilitarian features
commonly used in software marketing –i.e. branding, charity. . . – is needed to establish
and extend the effect discovered. In Chapter 3 we present an initial inquiry into
branding effects in software markets. Testing the boundary conditions of branding
effects, especially in conjunction with commonly employed business strategies would
be a significant contribution to the IS literature. We do not know how branding
and zero price strategies, or add-on content strategies interact for example. Finally,
while our inquiry into UGC and DGC in Chapter 4 produced intriguing results, it
would be interesting to see how other business strategies such as zero price strategies
interact with add-on content. Uncovering complementarities or substitution effects
between add-on strategy and other commonly employed business strategies will push
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the boundaries of both theory and practice forward. One dimension of consumption in
the age of digital plenty that was missing from all three of our studies was advertising.
It is very hard to observe the advertising budgets of the games and developers. Yet as
is noted in our results, the advertising budget may be driving the differences observed
in the head vs. tail of the long tail market. Such an inquiry may be more of interest
to practitioners, hence shall be considered.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR STATED PREFERENCE STUDIES
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A.1 Choice Sets Used in The Study
Set Price Source Feature
1 Paid Open Yes
Paid Closed Yes
Free Closed No
2 Paid Closed Yes
Free Closed No
Paid Open No
3 Paid Closed No
Free Closed Yes
Free Open Yes
4 Paid Closed Yes
Paid Open No
Free Open Yes
5 Free Open No
Free Closed No
Paid Open Yes
6 Free Open No
Paid Open Yes
Paid Closed No
7 Free Closed Yes
Free Open Yes
Paid Open No
8 Free Open No
Free Closed Yes
Paid Closed No
Table 12. Experimental Design of Choice Sets
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A.2 Covariance Matrix for Experimental Design
Free Open Feat Free × Open Feat × Open
Free 0.14 0 0 0 0
Open 0 0.14 0 0 0
Feat 0 0 0.14 0 0
Free × Open 0 0 0 0.14 0
Feat × Open 0 0 0 0 0.14
Table 13. Covariance Matrix of the Experimental Design
89
A.3 Open Source Familiarity Manipulation
Figure 7. News titles used for familiarity manipulation
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A.4 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Levels n %
∑
%
OSS_use Yes 537 78.8 78.9
No 139 20.4 99.3
all 681 100.0
age 13-17 1 0.1 0.1
18-25 183 26.9 27.0
26-34 267 39.2 66.2
35-54 186 27.3 93.5
55-64 36 5.3 98.8
65+ 8 1.2 100.0
all 681 100.0
gender Male 395 58.0 58.0
Female 286 42.0 100.0
all 681 100.0
education Less than High School 2 0.3 0.3
High School 58 8.5 8.8
Some College 196 28.8 37.6
2 Year Degree 80 11.8 49.3
4 Year Degree 262 38.5 87.8
Masters’ 73 10.7 98.5
Professional 10 1.4 100
all 681 100.0
Income Below 20K 181 26.6 26.6
20K-30K 102 15.0 41.6
30K-40K 101 14.8 56.4
40K-50K 81 11.9 68.3
50K-60K 69 10.1 78.4
60K-70K 52 7.6 86.0
70K-80K 10 1.5 87.5
80K-90K 58 8.5 96.0
90K+ 27 4.0 100.0
all 681 100.0
Table 14. Descriptive statistics
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR USER ENGAGEMENT STUDIES
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B.1 Excluding Popular Games
I used observed user bases (Percent variable) to determine the most popular and
popular games. Since the long tail argument states the head of the tail is a small
portion of the total population, I selected cut off for most popular games as being
owned by 1% of the sample at any point of their lifetime. For popular games I reduced
the cut off to .2%. This resulted in tagging 168 games as most popular, and 742 games
as popular.
In the tables below, the first model is based on the full dataset, second based on
exclusion of most popular games from analysis, the third model is where popular
games are excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable for Table 15 is log of
average minutes and the dependent variable for Table 16 is the log of number of users.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 2.0046 (0.2080)∗∗∗ 1.9721 (0.2097)∗∗∗ 1.7702 (0.2431)∗∗∗
Weekly Dummies Y ES Y ES Y ES
New −0.2242 (0.0055)∗∗∗ −0.2163 (0.0056)∗∗∗ −0.2092 (0.0060)∗∗∗
log(ListPricet−1 + 1) 0.0042 (0.0082) 0.0004 (0.0083) −0.0007 (0.0089)
free 0.8407 (0.1085)∗∗∗ 0.7170 (0.1121)∗∗∗ 0.5579 (0.1339)∗∗∗
Discountt−1 −0.0223 (0.0068)∗∗ −0.0267 (0.0069)∗∗∗ −0.0274 (0.0076)∗∗∗
BundledBefore −0.0851 (0.0055)∗∗∗
log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.2389 (0.0169)
∗∗∗ 0.2384 (0.0169)∗∗∗ 0.2628 (0.0224)∗∗∗
Social −0.6211 (0.0642)∗∗∗ −0.7332 (0.0639)∗∗∗ −0.8874 (0.0656)∗∗∗
log(DGCt−1 + 1) 1.7232 (0.0600)
∗∗∗ 1.6768 (0.0594)∗∗∗ 1.7344 (0.0644)∗∗∗
Uniq −0.2545 (0.3029) −0.1669 (0.3067) −0.2338 (0.3266)
log(Percentt−1 + 1) −38.7283 (1.8380)∗∗∗ −3.9957 (8.1988) 55.3011 (17.9388)∗∗
Social ×log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.1191 (0.0237)∗∗∗ 0.0846 (0.0258)∗∗ 0.1147 (0.0347)∗∗∗
Social ×log(DGCt−1 + 1) 0.6442 (0.0911)∗∗∗ 0.6445 (0.0927)∗∗∗ 0.6358 (0.1053)∗∗∗
Social × Uniq 5.0220 (0.7590)∗∗∗ 5.8512 (0.7850)∗∗∗ 6.8936 (0.8650)∗∗∗
Social ×log(Percentt−1 + 1)) 3.4111 (2.0797) 77.3462 (11.7815)∗∗∗ 473.8654 (29.3720)∗∗∗
AIC 519714.7665 512360.3897 492763.8761
BIC 520603.1812 513235.8574 493631.6422
Log Likelihood −259775.3832 −256099.1948 −246300.9380
Num. obs. 374867 365216 332090
Num. groups: AppID 6967 6799 6225
Variance: AppID 6.0322 5.7914 5.6393
Variance: AppID log(UGC + 1) 0.0656 0.0662 0.0976
Variance: AppID log(DGC + 1) 3.9489 3.8009 3.9526
Variance: Residual 0.2039 0.2075 0.2253
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 15. Robustness Check Based on Exclusion of Popular Games for Use Models
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 2.3075 (0.0388)∗∗∗ 2.2396 (0.0366)∗∗∗ 1.9030 (0.0359)∗∗∗
Weekly Dummies Y ES Y ES Y ES
New 0.5671 (0.0044)∗∗∗ 0.5669 (0.0044)∗∗∗ 0.5719 (0.0045)∗∗∗
log(ListPricet−1 + 1) −0.1877 (0.0071)∗∗∗ −0.1820 (0.0072)∗∗∗ −0.1546 (0.0073)∗∗∗
free 1.7249 (0.1117)∗∗∗ 1.3687 (0.1038)∗∗∗ 1.0140 (0.1079)∗∗∗
Discountt−1 0.9204 (0.0054)
∗∗∗ 0.9172 (0.0055)∗∗∗ 0.8664 (0.0057)∗∗∗
Bundled 0.2502 (0.0047)∗∗∗
log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.1638 (0.0322)
∗∗∗ 0.1426 (0.0291)∗∗∗ 0.1033 (0.0300)∗∗∗
Social 0.3128 (0.0572)∗∗∗ 0.2556 (0.0527)∗∗∗ 0.1882 (0.0494)∗∗∗
log(DGCt−1 + 1) 0.6337 (0.0719)
∗∗∗ 0.5196 (0.0635)∗∗∗ 0.4388 (0.0622)∗∗∗
Uniq 0.7082 (0.2441)∗∗ 1.2632 (0.2454)∗∗∗ 1.2074 (0.2474)∗∗∗
log(Percentt−1 + 1) 47.9216 (1.5477)
∗∗∗ 442.1556 (6.8068)∗∗∗ 1212.1987 (14.2243)∗∗∗
Social ×log(UGCt−1 + 1) 0.1164 (0.0449)∗∗ 0.0862 (0.0443) 0.1237 (0.0466)∗∗
Social ×log(DGCt−1 + 1) 0.5538 (0.1089)∗∗∗ 0.5614 (0.0997)∗∗∗ 0.5168 (0.1033)∗∗∗
Social × Uniq 2.4862 (0.6268)∗∗∗ 1.1999 (0.6444) 0.7239 (0.6724)
Social × log(Percentt−1 + 1) −27.1866 (1.7287)∗∗∗ −284.7099 (9.8862)∗∗∗ −665.5331 (23.1773)∗∗∗
AIC 205292.7344 198499.9708 170296.7034
BIC 206135.2898 199329.4419 171116.8790
Log Likelihood −102566.3672 −99170.9854 −85069.3517
Num. obs. 277047 268239 238463
Num. groups: AppID 5736 5570 4998
Variance: AppID.(Intercept) 3.6151 2.9486 2.3342
Variance: AppID.log(UGC + 1) 0.1381 0.1129 0.1011
Variance: AppID.log(DGC + 1) 2.3882 1.8698 1.6820
Variance: Residual 0.1044 0.1049 0.1026
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 16. Robustness Check Based on Exclusion of Popular Games for User Models
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